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I.  INTRODUCTION: SINGLE-INQUIRY AND PLURALIST ACCOUNTS                     
OF INTERPRETATION 
This account of legal interpretation focuses mainly on wills and contracts.  
It adopts a pluralist approach, one that treats a number of factors as 
potentially relevant and does not assume that all relevant factors 
necessarily reduce to one overarching inquiry that is the same whatever 
legal text is being interpreted. 
The major controversy among the participants at the illuminating 
conference which gave rise to this issue’s essays was whether this kind of 
pluralist approach is defensible or, instead, interpretation of textual meaning 
in law (and indeed more broadly) reduces itself to a single inquiry.  
Although this article is primarily designed to explicate particular 
theoretical questions about the interpretation of wills and contracts, it is 
also intended to be a defense of a pluralist approach. 
Getting a handle on the exact disagreement between single-inquiry 
theorists and pluralists is not simple; doing so constitutes a crucial first step 
for evaluating what follows.  Proponents of a single-inquiry view typically 
claim that interpretation of the meaning of a communication reduces to a 
factual determination about the circumstances of the communication’s 
origin.  Larry Alexander, a convener of the conference, has consistently 
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adopted a writer’s (or speaker’s) intent approach,1 and that was the version 
of the single-inquiry view that attracted the widest support at the conference 
from other legal scholars and from literary critics.  According to this 
view, if I mean “shut the door,” but I slip and say “shut the window,” my 
communication means “shut the door,” however much I mislead 
listeners.  Put differently, the true meaning of what I have said is “shut 
the door.”  “Author’s intent” theorists do not deny that sentence meaning 
often diverges from speaker meaning, but they privilege the latter as the 
real meaning of the communication and the object of interpretation in a 
strict sense.  We can easily imagine a more textualist, listener-reader 
centered version of the single-inquiry view.  The objections I shall suggest 
to a single-minded author’s intent account of meaning apply to a single-
minded reader’s understanding approach as well. 
“Pluralists,” among whom I count myself, believe “meaning” is a 
practical concept, that interpretation to discern meaning is not reducible 
to a single inquiry.  Pluralists believe that the best account of meaning 
will vary among disciplines and among subfields within disciplines.2  
Exactly how to interpret a writing, exactly how to assign it meaning, will 
depend on the purposes of engaging in that endeavor, and these purposes 
may render many factors relevant.  When they look at law, pluralists 
note that judges and scholars consult multiple factors in discerning the 
meaning of legal texts. 
Were this consideration totally decisive, the pluralists would definitely 
win the day, because no one doubts that judges and other actors ascribe 
meaning to legal texts on the basis of many factors.  But the single-inquiry 
theorists mount a twofold response.  First, judges and lawyers may engage 
in a plurality of inquiries to decide how a text will apply to a situation, 
 1. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re 
Speaking?”, Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 967 (2004); Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities 
and the Authorities of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY 357 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995). 
 2. For example, criteria for the meaning of poems may differ from those for the 
meaning of ordinary private letters; criteria for the meaning of constitutional provisions 
may differ from those for the meaning of wills.  Since I submitted this article, Judge 
Aharon Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court has published PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN 
LAW (2005), a book aptly called magisterial by an advance reader.  Barak adopts a 
purposive approach to all fields of legal interpretation, but recognizes that differences 
among fields call for differences in which elements carry weight.  Were I to write this 
article today, I would draw heavily from his account and explicitly compare his views 
with my own. 
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but these efforts can be partly understood as their relying on the answer 
to one inquiry (say, sentence meaning) as evidence for the answer to 
another, controlling, inquiry (writer meaning).  In practice, the “controlling” 
inquiry (writer’s meaning) might even fade into the background if bars 
on evidence preclude most of the ways of discerning that meaning apart 
from sentence meaning. 
Second, insofar as interpreters self-consciously accord independent 
weight to the results of inquiries other than the focal one, to that degree 
they are not, whatever they may say, asking about the text’s meaning; 
they are surveying reasons that might incline them to displace that 
meaning with some alternative.  This aspect of their overall evaluation 
is a different exercise from interpretation in a strict sense (which is to 
discern meaning).  It may be that judges appropriately undertake this 
different exercise.  The single-inquiry theorists do not claim that their 
conceptualization of meaning and interpretation yields a direct answer to 
the practical question about how judges should decide legal cases; and 
these theorists do not even mind if we call this different exercise a form 
of interpretation.  But we must understand that interpretation in the true 
or strict sense it is not.  One way in which this idea was offered at the 
conference was that interpretation in the strict sense bears no interesting 
theoretical relation to other exercises in practical decision that are 
sometimes loosely included within “interpretation” in a broader sense. 
Let me say straight out that I think the conceptualization favored by 
single-inquiry theorists can work.  These theorists can provide a strict 
account of meaning and interpretation that does not do violence to social 
facts and relevant values.  I believe that, without doubt, a pluralist account 
can also work—a point that most of the single-inquiry theorists at the 
conference did not concede. 
How then should we choose between the two kinds of accounts?  
Conceptual clarity, present understanding within the discipline, and 
relation to desirable practice are three obvious criteria. 
The single-inquiry approach may seem to have a conceptual advantage 
over its competitor in sharply delineating various questions of fact 
and evaluation.  But pluralists do not blindly suppose that all aspects 
of interpretation are the same; they see as clearly as do the single-inquiry 
theorists that writer’s intent is not the same thing as modern reader 
understanding or coherence with other texts.  It is conceivable that the 
same single-inquiry approach works best for other fields of interpretation, 
such as literary criticism and religious hermeneutics, and that the 
desirability of a unifying theory should lead us to adopt that conceptual 
approach for law.  Without undertaking the effort here, I shall simply assert 
my strong skepticism that across diverse disciplines, the same single 
inquiry is best understood as the key to interpretation of meanings. 
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In regard to present understanding within the law of common law 
systems, the pluralists win hands down.  Relatively few judges and 
scholars talk as if the meaning of legal texts reduces to a single 
inquiry.3
The question about desirable practice is more subtle.  The single-inquiry 
theory contemplates a two (or multi) step approach: figure out meaning 
and then decide whether to displace it.  But what if much judging never 
undertakes step one, that is, never tries to determine exactly what is a 
text’s meaning according to the crucial single inquiry?  That, in fact, is 
the reality, whatever one takes as the favored single inquiry.  (To be more 
precise, I do not deny that likely writer’s intent will often play a role and 
will sometimes be decisive.  I claim only (1) that judges will sometimes 
resolve what counts as a text’s meaning without settling the question of 
writer’s intent, and (2) that proceeding in this manner is desirable.)  The 
single-inquiry theorist has the resources to accommodate this reality 
about practice, acknowledging that in some legal cases judges may 
desirably reach a practical resolution without discerning meaning.  But, 
along with present understanding in law, this feature of desirable 
practice strongly favors the pluralist account as yielding less confusion 
and greater clarity. 
The disagreement over the better conceptualization very likely reflects 
underlying convictions, agendas, or tastes that are ideological.  Although 
the single-inquiry approach to meaning and (strict) interpretation does 
not rule out other bases for practical decisions in legal cases, it does 
seem to cast them in a suspicious light.  Who could doubt that judges 
should interpret statutes to discern meaning?  If they displace meaning, 
are they not indulging themselves in creative disregard of legislative 
authority?  On the other hand, if, as the pluralist account supposes, judges 
possess a stock of standards of interpretation to determine meaning, 
when they employ these they seem naturally to be doing what they 
should.  An example I raised during discussion illustrates the rhetorical 
connection between conceptual theories of meaning and practical 
 3. Even Justice Scalia, who strongly emphasizes the ordinary understanding of 
textual language, makes some limited room for canons of construction and for 
interpretation that renders a legal provision coherent with other parts of the law.  See, 
e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1991).  For one 
defense of a single approach to interpretation in law, see James L. Robertson, Myth and 
Reality—Or Is It “Perception and Taste”?—In the Reading of Donative Documents, 61 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1045 (1993). 




appraisals of judging.4   
Arizona treats as confidential “any confession made to [a clergyman] 
in his character as clergyman or priest in the course of discipline 
enjoined by the church to which he belongs.”5  I assumed (hypothetically) 
that the law was adopted early in the twentieth century when a number 
of states had priest-penitent privileges that were quite limited; but that 
the overwhelming modern view is that the privilege should extend to 
communications to clergy made in ordinary counseling sessions.  For 
years, let us imagine, Arizona prosecutors have not sought testimony 
from clerics about what they have learned in counseling; but now a 
divorce lawyer seeks to require testimony from a minister of the United 
Church of Christ about what a parishioner-husband said to her in 
counseling. 
The judge first looks at the natural language of the law.  “Confession” 
made in the “course of discipline enjoined” by the church does not seem 
to cover a husband’s admission in marital counseling that he struck his 
wife, given to a minister of denomination that has no discipline of 
confession to individual clerics.  But, if the church encourages couples with 
marital difficulties to seek counseling, privileging such an admission is 
not an extreme stretch of the language.  Reflecting both on the fact that 
the population of Arizona in the early twentieth century was substantially 
Roman Catholic, and on the narrowness of the priest-penitent privilege 
as it was then conceived, the judge concludes that the relevant legislators 
(probably) meant to privilege only formal Roman Catholic confession 
and perhaps confession in the few other churches (such as the Episcopal 
Church) that retain individual confession but do not make it mandatory 
or encourage it strongly. 
I asserted that many judges in this position, influenced by modern 
conceptions of clerical privilege and concerned about favoring some 
religions over others,6 would now conclude that the language should be 
taken in a broader, more inclusive (though somewhat strained) sense.  
On a pluralist, multifactor understanding, this example shows how the 
meaning of a law can change over time; the judge’s interpretive question 
is what ingredients should figure in a modern interpretation of the 
language.  For the single-inquiry (author’s intent) theorist, meaning was 
fixed at enactment.  The judge who reaches the conclusion that the 
authors most probably intended a restricted meaning is left only with the 
 4. I here give the illustration more precision than I managed in the give and take 
of oral comments. 
 5. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2233 (West 1956). 
 6. A judge might worry that limiting the privilege to clerics of a few religious 
groups would impermissibly establish those groups; but I do not mean to rely here on 
any judgment that the more restricted privilege would actually be unconstitutional. 
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question whether to displace that meaning. Now, as far as logic is 
concerned, a pluralist could well contend, “Leave a change like this to 
the legislature,” and a single-inquiry theorist might say, “Let the judge 
go ahead and displace this meaning instead of imposing a tiresome task 
on legislators.”  But readers will not be surprised that most single-
inquiry theorists did not look favorably on this exercise in judicial 
creativity; most pluralists thought that such an interpretation (in their 
sense) could well be within the bounds of judicial authority.  Thus, the 
conceptual rhetoric connected to practical conclusions in a predictable 
fashion. 
What follows in this essay, excerpts from an introduction and chapters 
on wills and contracts in a book on legal interpretation on which I am 
now working, represents a pluralist approach.  Most of us who write 
about legal interpretation think mainly about statutory and constitutional 
texts and common law principles.  Wills and contracts are also legally 
authoritative texts, ones serving mainly private objectives.  Because they 
do not present the same issues of multiple authorship and continuity over 
long periods of time as do statutes and constitutions, their analysis yields 
sharp insight into interpretive issues that arise even when the connections of 
author and text are comparatively simple.  
My examination is limited in two important respects.  Although most 
of the basic questions about textual interpretation that we shall examine 
are also raised within civil-law countries, I focus on common-law systems.  
I do not consider how much guidance we might glean from forms of 
nonlegal interpretation; these might provide helpful analogies or provide 
reasons to think some approaches are more promising than others. 
Although the body of this essay does not directly contest single-inquiry 
theories, it demonstrates how extremely awkwardly such theories apply 
to wills and contracts. 
II.  FUNDAMENTAL INTERPRETIVE QUESTIONS AND POSSIBILITIES 
A.  Illustrative Problems 
After Dr. Rowland agreed to work in the South Pacific Health 
Service, covering hundreds of islands, he and his wife, a nurse who 
was going with him, made wills.  They knew they would be taking 
many trips from island to island in small ships.  Using printed forms 
and without consulting a lawyer, each provided that the other would 
receive everything if he or she survived the writer of the will.  In the 




event of Mrs. Rowland’s death “preceding or coinciding with” his, Dr. 
Rowland left his property to his brother and niece.  Mrs. Rowland’s 
will, using the same language, left her estate to her niece.  When a ship 
on which they were traveling in the Solomon Islands went down, no 
one survived.  The Rowlands had drowned quickly or been eaten by 
fish.  Under English law, when the order of deaths was uncertain, the 
younger person was presumed to have outlived the older.  The English 
courts had to decide whether the deaths of the Rowlands “coincided,” 
in which case Dr. Rowland’s property would go to his relatives, or 
their deaths did not coincide, in which event his property would pass to 
his wife and then on to her niece.7
Ivo Planić, a Croatian soccer star playing in a German league, signs a 
contract to play with the American Metro Stars “during its season.”  The 
Metro Stars agree to pay half of his $300,000 salary if he is unable to 
play with them because he is injured before he joins the team.  During 
the last game of the German season, Ivo suffers a severe fracture, which 
will take a year to heal.  At the time of his injury, the Metro Stars had 
had a month of training and had begun to play exhibition games; the 
beginning of the regular schedule was three weeks off.  To determine if 
the team owes Ivo $150,000, a court must decide whether he breached 
the contract by not joining the team during its training camp and 
exhibition schedule or whether the language “during its season” limited 
his obligation to the regular season.8
In 1964, as part of comprehensive civil rights legislation, Congress 
adopted Title VII forbidding employers to “discriminate” against anyone 
because of his or her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.9  A 
section of the statute inserted during deliberations in Congress provided 
that the law should not be interpreted “to require”10 any employer to 
grant preferential treatment based on factors such as race.  As part of 
an employment contract for a plant in Louisiana where very few 
African-Americans held skilled jobs, Kaiser Aluminum Co. and the 
United Steelworkers Union agreed that some places in a craft training 
program would be reserved for African-Americans even if they had less 
seniority than white applicants.  In a case that proved highly controversial 
as well as important, the Supreme Court needed to decide whether this 
form of affirmative action violated the statute.11
Law enforcement officers often plant electronic devices that transmit 
 7. In re Rowland, 1963 Ch. 1, 7 (Eng. C.A.). 
 8. This is an imaginary case. 
 9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 703(j) (2000). 
 11. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197–98, 209 (1979) (deciding 
that the law did not bar such affirmative action). 
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or record conversations on undercover agents and informants.  Under the 
Fourth Amendment, the government is not permitted to engage in 
“unreasonable searches.”12  The standard requisites to make a search 
“reasonable” are that officers have a substantial probability of finding 
evidence of a crime and that they obtain a search warrant.  If one person 
in a conversation, a government agent or informer, uses an electronic 
device without the knowledge and consent of the other party, does that 
constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?13
B.  Dimensions of Inquiry: Textual Interpretation 
These illustrations from a will, a contract, a statute, and a constitutional 
provision vary in many respects, but each involves a text with legal authority 
that needs to be interpreted.  For any text of this sort, an interpretive 
approach, whether explicitly or implicitly, must answer certain questions.  
With a degree of arbitrariness in categorization, we can discern seven 
dimensions of choice that characterize the interpretation of legal texts.  
How an interpretive endeavor in law should go forward depends on just 
how elements of these dimensions should be combined; few will be 
surprised to learn that the right (or a good) combination shifts among 
different kinds of legal texts. 
Here is a quick summary of dimensions of choice, followed by some 
further explorations. 
1.  Writer or Reader?  
Should interpretation rely on the perspective of the writer or that of 
the reader, or some combination of the two?  Of course, the typical 
interpreter is a reader, but that does not settle whether the interpreter 
should try to adopt the perspective of the writer.  Thus, a court might or 
might not interpret Dr. Rowland’s will in accord with what Rowland 
probably wanted and understood. 
2.  Subjective or Objective? 
Should an interpreter seek to understand how actual writers or readers 
have understood a text, or should he focus on what a reasonable writer 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 13. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).  A divided Supreme Court 
determined that no search was involved.  Id. at 752–54. 




or a reasonable reader would understand?  One form of subjective 
interpretation is definitely not appropriate in law.  An interpreter is not 
justified in merely settling on his own personal reaction to a text, 
whatever others might think about the text (as the reader of a poem 
might be justified in doing).  The interpreter tries to rely on bases of 
interpretation that will be, or should be, persuasive to others. 
3.  Abstract or Contextual? 
Are words and phrases to be interpreted to have a more or less 
uniform meaning across a range of situations or tied closely to specific 
context?  To take the crucial word in the Rowland case, should 
“coinciding” mark out the same degree of temporal proximity, regardless 
of the occasions someone foresaw when he wrote his will and of the 
actual circumstances of his death, or should the term be treated flexibly 
in relation to particular situations? 
4.  Specific Aim or General Objective 
The apparent aims of a specific textual provision typically fit broader 
objectives.  But sometimes an interpreter identifies a tension or conflict 
between the two.  How then should she interpret the provision?  To take 
our Title VII example, suppose that the statute’s language forbidding 
employers to “discriminate” seems to bar all preferential treatment based 
on race, and that the statutory scheme as a whole is largely designed to 
prevent outright discrimination against African-Americans.  A judge 
might infer that if employers are forbidden to engage in voluntary 
affirmative action, they will fail to correct much outright discrimination 
against African-Americans that is less than obvious, instead waiting to 
see if anyone directs enforcement efforts against them.14  Because, given 
limited resources, public enforcement can be focused on only a small 
slice of discriminating employers, the consequence of reading the statute 
to bar voluntary affirmative action will be to perpetuate much illegal 
discrimination against African-Americans.15  How should judges then 
interpret the significance of “discriminate” as it applies to affirmative 
action? 
5.  Meaning, External Policies, and Justice 
How far should courts, and other interpreters who can make binding 
 14. See generally United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209–16 (1979) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 15. Id. 
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judgments about the significance of texts, take considerations of justice 
and external policies into account—even when they were probably not 
embraced by the writers of the text and might not figure in an ordinary 
reader’s account of what the text means?  One question of justice is 
achieving what seems to be a fair resolution of the particular dispute the 
parties bring to court.  An important external policy may be the efficient 
use of resources: perhaps courts should hesitate to interpret wills, 
contracts, and statutes to require waste, even if that is what they seem to 
say. 
6.  Inquiry Limited to the Document or Including External Evidence 
A critical question in every area of interpretation of legally 
authoritative texts is how far outside the documents courts should go.  If 
Ivo’s contract with the Metro Stars is written, can judges hear testimony 
about what the parties said orally to each other, or should they limit 
themselves to the writing?  Should judges consider legislative history or 
restrict themselves to the language of statutes?  Exactly what outside 
sources judges should consult is controverted in major areas of modern 
law. 
7.  Time of Writing or Time of Interpretation 
Should interpretation focus on the time a legal document was written 
or the time it is interpreted?  Of course, interpreters logically must act at 
the later stage, but they may or may not see their job as discerning how 
things looked when a legal document was written.  This question about 
time becomes critical if the authority of a statute or constitution stretches 
out over decades or centuries. 
Let us now retrace our steps to deal with some nuances. 
1.  An interpreter focusing on writers and readers must implicitly 
decide who counts and for how much.  With wills, is it the understanding of 
the testators that matters or that of their lawyers?  Within a legislature, 
do the views of an active sponsor of a law count more, or less, than those 
of a passive member whose vote is crucial to passage?  Among possible 
readers of a statute, should an interpreter focus on experts in the field 
(say, atomic energy), on lawyers, or on ordinary people; on those who 
will be regulated by a law, on administrative officials, or on outsiders?  
In some instances, notably when one individual has acted under the 




instructions of another, the person who must later make an authoritative 
interpretation may be mainly interested in how a particular original 
reader (the individual who received the instructions) did (reasonably) 
understand them. 
If an interpreter thinks the perceptions of both readers and writers 
matter, he must combine these in some way.  That may entail giving 
conclusive force in particular respects to what a writer or a reader thinks; 
it may mean giving the views of each some vague, indeterminate weight.  
 2. An interpreter seeking to discern the subjective view of writers or of 
readers must determine exactly what attitude or understanding matters.  
Three possible candidates in respect to writers are hopes, expectations, 
and sense of proper understanding.  Ordinarily these will coalesce: the 
writer will expect his words to be taken a certain way, he hopes that will 
happen, and he thinks that should happen.  But these perspectives can 
split apart, in which event an interpreter must decide which to credit.  
Another question about appraisal of a writer’s intentions concerns the 
place of hypothetical intentions: how far should an interpreter consider 
what a writer would have thought about matters she did not consider?  
Although the point is less obvious, similar questions can arise when the 
interpreter appraises reader responses to a text. 
Interpreters who rely on writers or readers taken in some objective 
way must determine how to construct the “objective” person.  What 
information will she be assumed to have?  Will the constructed person 
be the average person in a relevant category (say, expert, lawyer, or lay 
person), the reasonable person (free of some of the ignorance and 
irrationality of real people), or the most astute person (with capabilities 
exceeding those of ordinary people)?  Almost any construction of an 
objective person requires an estimate of the responses of actual people, 
and, if we probe deeply enough, therefore requires both decision about 
whether hopes, expectations, or sense of proper interpretation matters 
most and decision about how to combine different views held by 
different people.16
Many approaches to interpretation combine appraisal of subjective 
and objective responses, with the particular combination depending on 
the kind of interpretation that is involved. 
3. Although human communication rests on individuals having linguistic 
competence about the meaning of words in a language, the exact 
meaning of words uttered in ordinary conversation depends on context.  
Against the powerful reasons for also understanding words within legal 
texts in their full contexts are some countervailing arguments.  One is 
 16. See Kent Greenawalt, Are Mental States Relevant for Statutory and Constitutional 
Interpretation?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1609, 1629–36 (2000). 
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that ascertaining precise context is too difficult for judges and other 
interpreters.  Another argument is that if the drafters of legal documents 
know how courts will understand particular terms, they can craft the 
documents with a greater degree of precision and confidence than might 
be possible were interpreters to inquire into detailed, disputable claims 
about context.  Such arguments would be available to support the position 
that “coinciding,” “during its season,” and “discriminate” should be given 
standard, uniform meanings in legal documents (or legal documents of a 
specific kind), despite their shifting coverage in ordinary conversation. 
4. An appraisal of overall purposes can assist in identifying mistakes 
and in discerning the significance of a particular communication.  Thus, 
we see that a law that says that forms must be filed “before December 
31” is keyed to the end of the year.  We may conclude that the failure to 
say “on or before December 31” was probably a mistake.17  If a contract 
leaves open the time for performance, courts will determine what time is 
reasonable given the contract’s purposes. 
Sometimes a specific provision, not the consequence of a mistake, will 
seem at odds with general purposes.  In that event, courts must make a 
choice between the two. 
5. In the way that the general purposes of a statute or contract may 
help guide a judge who interprets specific provisions, so also may 
external policies.  The law18 assumes that most people do not wish to 
disinherit their children; if the language of a will is unclear on the point, 
a probate judge will interpret it not to exclude family members.  Because 
this policy corresponds with common sentiments, one may fairly guess 
that a writer whose will is unclear probably did not mean to disinherit 
children.  The serious issue arises when, despite whatever force the policy 
may carry about a writer’s intent, he probably did aim to exclude and 
that is how the will’s terms are most plausibly read.  When an interpreter 
relies on an external policy to override apparent meaning and probable 
intent, then he relies on the policy to overcome standard techniques to 
discern meaning. 
6. The notion of interpreters confining themselves to a document is a 
bit misleading.  Any interpreter brings to bear her knowledge of the 
language and of general circumstances.  For example, if a man has 
 17. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93–96 (1985). 
 18. See WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, REVISED TREATISE: PAGE ON 
THE LAW OF WILLS 90–91 (1961), with 2004 Cumulative Supplement [hereinafter PAGE 
ON WILLS]. 




contracted to work in an office for ten hours on Friday in exchange for 
$400, an interpreter will not conclude that he has broken the contract by 
leaving after eight hours because the building has caught fire.  
Interpreters commonly consult dictionaries to learn the meaning of 
words they do not recognize, and when texts contain phrases common in 
law, judges refer to the history of how those phrases are understood in 
law. 
The serious questions about external sources concern various 
explanations, oral or written, that have not found their way into the text 
itself, such as indications in the legislative process of what a statute 
accomplishes, and other “external” evidences of meaning, such as past 
relations of contracting parties. 
7. When an interpreter focuses on readers, he may consider readers at 
the time a text was written, or modern readers, or both.  For statutes and 
constitutions that have stood the test of time, a modern reader may 
understand provisions differently than would have readers at the time of 
adoption.  For some relatively few cases an intermediate period may be 
important.  Suppose a statute is passed in 1800, a 1960 charter for a 
charitable group refers to the statute, and the charter is interpreted in 
2005.  A court might ask how the statute’s language would have been 
understood in 1960. 
One might initially think that the time dimension does not arise with 
writers of words that carry legal consequences; they, after all, engaged in 
a performative utterance19—an utterance that changes the world in some 
way—at one particular point in time.  But one may ask how the writer of 
a will or contract subsequently regards its terms, and one might think of 
a legislature as a kind of writer in continuing session, reissuing or itself 
reinterpreting the documents it has adopted. 
C.  Nontextual Legal Interpretation and Its Relation to                           
Textual Interpretation 
Within common law systems, not all interpretation is of particular 
texts.  Although textual interpretation differs from nontextual interpretation, 
we need to understand ways in which the distinction is less than sharp. 
When judges render decisions about the common law—a rule about a 
manufacturer’s liability for a defectively designed product—they look to all 
highly relevant previous common law decisions and to settled practices, 
and they make judgments about fairness and efficiency.  Although the 
 19. The phrase “performative utterance” is drawn largely from J.L. Austin.  I 
discuss various kinds of what I call situation altering utterances in KENT GREENAWALT, 
SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, 57–59, 63–65 (1989). 
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decision of a case in the present does not rest on the meaning of a single 
text, the texts of prior opinions are extremely important.  And, on 
occasion, a determination may turn almost entirely on the language of 
one authoritative opinion. 
Interpretation of the meaning of vague constitutional texts often 
includes assessment of broad historical understandings of acceptable 
government action.  What forms of interference with speech and press 
did the founders regard as illegitimate?  What searches did people deem 
reasonable?  More generally, when a judge decides to interpret a particular 
provision in light of “the whole Constitution,” that is not so different 
from interpreting the nature of American government, a form of 
nontextual interpretation.  Further, in both constitutional and much 
statutory interpretation, judges rely heavily on what earlier judicial 
decisions have already settled, thus bringing elements of common law 
interpretation into what is formally textual interpretation.  Thus, textual 
and nontextual interpretations are often interwoven.20
D.  Clarifications about the Term “Interpretation” 
The term “interpretation” can be given broader or narrower meanings.  
Lawyers often regard whatever factors figure in a court’s final decision 
about how to treat a particular text as involving interpretation.  One 
might differentiate “interpretation” from discerning obvious meaning, on 
the one hand, and from creatively filling in content by “construction,” on 
the other. On this understanding, “interpretation” falls between two poles; 
an interpreter would be genuinely trying to discern a text’s meaning, but 
meaning would not be obvious.  And, as we have seen, some theorists 
limit interpretation in a strict sense to a single kind of inquiry. 
“Interpretation” may also be distinguished from “application.”  Here 
the notion is that someone first interprets meaning and then renders an 
application to specific circumstances.  Critics of this conceptualization 
argue that applications are part of how one interprets; they fill out the 
meaning of the text that is being applied. 
If one employs these various distinctions, one must recognize that in 
many actual cases, saying when interpretation gives way to construction 
or when it yields to application will not be easy.  More importantly, 
when judges ascribe meaning to legal texts, they rarely distinguish an 
 20. In this essay, I do not address the crucial questions about nontextual interpretation; 
these are less easily broken down than the questions about textual interpretation. 




exercise that is interpretation from more activist construction and more 
discrete application.  The sense of interpretation I employ is broad, 
including all efforts to discern meaning and determine particular 
applications that depend on that meaning.21
E.  Tentative General Conclusions about Legal Interpretation 
It may help the reader in evaluating the details of what follows to have 
a sense of my general conclusions about the interpretation of legal texts. 
1. General theoretical considerations about the nature of language do 
not determine how courts do, or should, interpret texts that have legal 
force.  On issues about which people can disagree, resolution depends on 
normative assessments about how a legal system should work. 
2. The desirability of a method of interpretation depends only partly 
on what method, perfectly applied, would yield the best results.  For legal 
inquiries, the methods must be ones fallible human beings, judges, and juries, 
are competent to make.  These methods should not open up opportunities 
for intentional misuse and unconscious bias, so far as these can be avoided. 
Any method should be reasonably economical.  It should not be too 
cumbersome.  And officials should not have to apply it too frequently.  
For the most part, people should grasp their legal rights and obligations 
without going to court.  Ordinary people should understand contractual 
terms without litigating and without consulting lawyers.  If many statutes 
need to be too complex to be grasped by ordinary people, at least lawyers 
and experts in the fields should be able to understand them.  An expert 
should be capable of giving confident advice about a statute’s meaning.  
In short, official interpretation must proceed under the assumptions that 
initial interpretation will often be made by nonlawyers and that in most 
circumstances official interpretation will not be necessary.  Unofficial 
interpretation is the crucial backdrop for official interpretation. 
3. In general, subjective and objective elements should mingle in a 
desirable strategy of interpretation.  It matters what the people who use 
language and those who are the main audience of language believe the 
language accomplishes, but the sense that the language conveys to a 
broader audience is also intrinsically important.  Further, reliance on 
objective elements may be valuable in preventing fraud and in avoiding 
 21. I do, however, distinguish interpretation from something that is undeniably and 
explicitly more creative than interpretation.  Courts may say they are themselves 
providing terms, an exercise that they may say depends on their interpretation of an 
entire document.  Courts may also, on grounds of changed circumstances or public 
policy or constitutional restraint, explicitly revise the content of a legal text.  Such 
revisions raise sharply the issue of the authority of courts.  Although the line between 
interpretation and outright revision matters, interpretation that stretches or substantially 
disregards ordinary meaning is not easily distinguishable from revision. 
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complicated tangles of inquiry.  The exact mix of subjective and objective 
elements depends on the domain of law.  Among the relevant considerations 
are the importance of the writer’s intentions, the number of writers and 
of primary addressees, and the political authority of the writers. 
For the most part, even when objective elements figure, they should be 
formulated in terms of specific contexts, not broad generalities. 
4. Legal interpretation, textual as well as nontextual, is some mix of 
discerning the past and evaluating what will be best in the future; the 
degree of each depends greatly on the area of law and particular legal 
problem. 
5. Counterfactual inquiries have an appropriate place in all, or nearly 
all, fields of legal interpretation, but they should be employed with 
caution. 
6. Courts should adopt standards of proof and persuasion that make it 
difficult to overcome the “natural sense” of language that is used, but in 
general they should not bar otherwise relevant inquiries.  Exactly what 
inquiries about meaning should be entertained depends partly on the 
kind of interpretation those who write authoritative words desire. 
7. Public policy considerations play a significant part in the ways 
courts should understand legal texts. Of course, the aim to have a 
strategy of interpretation that is reliable and economical is itself one kind 
of public policy, but I refer here to more substantive policies, such as 
achieving fair results and using resources efficiently, or promoting the 
welfare of children.  Just when courts should make interpretations 
guided by public policy is highly controversial, but two relevant factors 
are the specificity of language that is interpreted and whether “the law” 
for the case is privately or publicly created. 
With these general observations in hand, we are ready to give more 
concentrated attention to the interpretation of wills and contracts. 
III.  WILLS 
Among standard legal documents that courts interpret, wills are 
special in two respects. They are peculiarly unilateral; and their nominal 
authors are unavailable to testify about what they meant. 
Wills issue from single persons who are exclusive authors from a legal 
point of view.  Although lawyers and their staffs write many wills, and 
people often may not understand complex provision in their own wills, 
still a lawyer’s main job is to carry out the aims of a testator as 
completely as possible, not to intrude her own views about who should 





Wills are unilateral in a way that ordinary instructions from one 
person to another are not.  Instructions are issued to a recipient, who has 
a stake in how they are understood.22  Most instructions create expectations 
and induce reliance, affording strong reasons to grant a recipient’s 
perspective weight when someone reviews her performance.23  Wills differ: 
unless a person has contracted to include particular dispositions,24 she is 
free to alter her will up to the time she dies.  Thus, no one can rely with 
full confidence on the terms of the will of someone who is still living.  
Further, when the potential beneficiaries of a will do rely, they are much 
more likely to depend on what the writer says about the will than on the 
will’s actual language.  It follows that if a court’s interpretation fails to 
correspond with the apparent meaning of a will’s language, that will not 
typically defeat legitimate expectations developed before the writer’s 
death.25 
The period between a will’s being made public and a court’s settling 
its content differs.  Someone who then relies on the will’s language 
might be disappointed by an interpretation that deviates from it; and 
uncertainty about how a court may interpret a will could interfere with 
transactions that depend on a beneficiary’s receiving what he apparently 
has been given. 
When courts construe wills,26 their writers are not available to say 
what they were trying to do (or how their wishes might have changed by 
the time they died).  The formal requirements of wills and principles of 
their construction partly respond to the harsh fact of our mortality. 
A.  Standards and Sources of Interpretation 
With wills, as with other legal documents, courts need standards for 
 22. For some “instructions,” matters are still more complicated.  A search warrant 
is issued both to guide police officers (who may themselves have written the warrant for 
judicial approval) while they are making a search and to provide notice to a homeowner 
about the search’s appropriate limits (because homeowners rarely read warrants carefully 
and rarely are able to prevent excesses, exclusion of evidence is the main deterrent of 
abuse). 
 23. In respect to informal instructions, see Kent Greenawalt, From the Bottom Up, 
82 CORNELL L. REV. 994 (1997). 
 24. Even if she has entered such a contract, she can change her will in a way that 
does not correspond with what she has agreed to.  The change is effective, but her estate 
must meet her contractual obligations. 
 25. An important exception involves the wills of spouses, especially those in 
second marriages with children of earlier marriages.  Each spouse may have legitimate 
expectations in what the will of the other provides, although it would not follow that a 
court should rely on the ordinary meaning of words rather than another standard. 
 26. On the kinds of lawsuits in which provisions of wills are contested, see PAGE 
ON WILLS, supra note 18, at § 31. 
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how to interpret and for what evidences of meaning to consult.  Should 
they look to the general meaning of a will’s language, at the writer’s 
likely intent, or to a more subtle variation or mixture of elements?  Should 
they take into account idiosyncrasies of the testator’s background, her 
peculiar understanding of words, or what she said orally she was trying 
to do?  
The striking English case involving the married couple who died 
together at sea sharply poses many of these issues about wills.27  Aware 
that he and his wife would be taking trips in the South Pacific from 
island to island in small ships, Dr. Rowland, using a printed form, and  
without consulting a lawyer, provided in his handwritten will that his 
wife would receive everything if she survived him, but in the event of 
her death “preceding or coinciding with” his own, his property would go 
to his brother and niece.28  What did “coinciding” mean in the will?  All 
the judges in the Court of Chancery assumed Dr. Rowland used the word 
self-consciously, not that it was part of a will form to which he gave no 
attention.29 
1.  Standards of Meaning 
If we focus on what this word in the will means, we might look at 
usage by the broad community or usage by the doctor himself.30  If the 
Rowlands deliberately chose to use the term “coinciding,” knowing that 
they would take many voyages together on small ships in the South 
Pacific, Dr. Rowland probably assumed that the term covered circumstances 
in which the two might be killed in a common wreck and died within 
seconds or minutes of each other,31 what very probably occurred.  
 27. In re Roland, 1963 Ch. 1 (Eng. C.A.). 
 28. Id. at 3.  Under a law providing that when the order of deaths is “uncertain,” 
the younger person (Mrs. Rowland) was presumed to have survived the older.  Id. at 2; 
Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 184 (Eng.). 
 29. The facts leave unclear whether the Rowlands merely adopted standard 
language on a form or considered the words.  It is extremely unlikely that they made up 
the legal sounding phrase “preceding or coinciding.”  The fact that their wills were 
handwritten probably shows they were at least aware of the words, unlike many people 
who sign forms. 
 30. An intermediate possibility is usage by a special class of persons. See JOHN 
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2458 (1981).  Wigmore also 
refers to usage by parties to a bilateral act.  If one thought of the Rowlands as agreeing 
on similar terms for their wills, one might think that the understanding of Mrs. Rowland 
should count. 
 31. If Rowland did not think about the term, perhaps it should be given the effect 




General usage is harder to pin down.  In some contexts, to say that two 
events “coincided” is to say that they occurred simultaneously;32 deaths 
separated by minutes do not occur simultaneously.  But “coincide” is not 
always taken so narrowly.  We might say that the reigns of two ancient 
monarchs coincided even though one reign began and ended three weeks 
before the other.33  People pay attention to the purposes for which words 
are used.  Recognizing that the context was a will and that a wife dying 
minutes later could make no use of her husband’s property, many people 
would say that two deaths “coincided” if they occurred from a common 
cause and within minutes of each other.34 
A judge who takes Dr. Rowland’s perspective and assumes that he did 
focus on the word “coinciding” should conclude that he probably 
understood the word to cover deaths only seconds or minutes apart 
caused by a shipwreck.  A court relying on general usage would have to 
decide how strictly “coincide” should be taken, and the extent to which 
people using that word would take account of the circumstances in 
which the Rowlands made their wills and in which they died. 
The majority of Chancery judges in Rowland adopted a standard of 
general usage that was strict.  Justice Harman equated “coincident” and 
“simultaneous,” and said that Rowland’s relatives had presented no evidence 
that the deaths were “simultaneous.”35  Justice Russell took as the standard 
whether “the ordinary man would say that the two deaths were coincident in 
point of time or simultaneous.”36  For him, it mattered neither whether 
he would have assumed, had he thought about it.  But it is hard to know what he would 
have thought, if he did not focus on the word.  On reflection, he might have thought that 
the standard term was inadequate. 
 32. “Simultaneous” appears in many dictionaries as a synonym of “coincident.”  
See, e.g., WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1099 (1986) (defining simultaneous 
as “existing or occurring at the same time: exactly coincident”). 
 33. One might resist this example on the ground that the reigns “coincided,” 
except for the weeks at each end.  On this view, a fairer test for whether two distinct 
events coincided is whether one might say that the deaths of John Adams and Thomas 
Jefferson, hours apart on the same day, coincided.  See eHistory, A Moment in Time 
Archives: The Strange Death of Jefferson and Adams, http://www.ehistory.com/world/ 
amit/display.cfm?amit_id=2191 (last visited April 25, 2005) (both Jefferson & Adams 
died on the same day, exactly 50 years after signing the Declaration of Independence).  I 
am inclined to think that “coincided” is fairly flexible, depending on the time period 
being considered.  Thus, if one asks how far apart our first four presidents died, one 
might say that Washington died first by many years, that Madison survived by some 
years, and that the deaths of Adams and Jefferson coincided. 
 34. Some sticklers about language might say that the deaths did not exactly 
coincide in a strict sense, although they were very close.  Even the sticklers would 
acknowledge that two deaths could relevantly coincide, even though an expert could tell 
us that one occurred a millionth of a second before the other.  For example, after a bomb 
blast, an expert might be able to say that a person closer to the explosion died 
milliseconds before someone standing five feet further away. 
 35. In re Roland, 1963 Ch. 1, 15 (Eng. C.A.). 
 36. Id.  He also argued that placement in the will of “coinciding” after “preceding” 
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the Rowlands died by shipwreck in the Pacific or by rail or auto accident 
in England, nor what situations they foresaw when they wrote their wills. 
Lord Denning disagreed sharply with his two colleagues. He contrasted 
his own approach with one favored in the nineteenth century, according 
to which judges inquired, “what is the ordinary and grammatical 
meaning of the word ‘coincide’ as used in the English language?”37  
Under that approach, “coincide” would mean “simultaneous” and might 
not cover two people holding each other as a ship sank—an absurd 
result.  The whole approach, he said, rests on a fallacy that a will’s 
construction should depend on the meaning of a testator’s words rather 
than on what he meant.  For Denning, “the whole object of construing a 
will is to find out the testator’s intentions,” what meaning the words bore 
for him.38  Dr. Rowland and his wife intended “coinciding” to have a 
wider meaning of “death on the same occasion by the same cause.”39  
Judge Russell rejoined that this understanding of “coinciding” suggests a 
time element, but one so rough that it is quite uncertain.40 
How should we evaluate the competing approaches in Rowland?41  
The rule the majority adopts is convenient to administer, and will allow 
uniform construction of “coinciding” in wills,42 although the judgments 
of ordinary people are both more contextualized to circumstance and 
purpose and more divergent than the justices suppose.43  According to 
afforded a reason to construe it as dealing only with time.  Id. 
 37. Id. at 8. 
 38. Id. at 10.  As I shall subsequently explain, finding out a writer’s intentions is 
not exactly the same as giving words the meaning they bore for him. 
 39. Id. at 11. 
 40. Id. at 18. 
 41. I put aside whatever force precedents may have had.  The majority could claim 
that its stance followed earlier cases that had been very strict about when deaths 
“coincide.”  The court had refused to say that deaths coincided when a husband and wife 
clung to each other as a ship went down.  See Underwood v. Wing Ch. 459, 4 De. G.M. 
& G. 633 (1855); Wing v. Angrave (1860) 8 H.L.C. 183.  However, judges found that 
the deaths of sisters from the same bomb were simultaneous in In re Pringle, 1946 Ch. 1, 
124, 124, 129–31 (Eng. C.A.). 
 42. If the judges in effect tell testators, “Whenever you use the word ‘coinciding,’ 
it will have the uniform meaning the law ascribes to the word,” how would an author’s 
intent theorist account for the meaning of “coinciding” in a will?  He might say that the 
real meaning is what the individual testator intends, even though judges will disregard 
that meaning; he might say the judges who set the standard are the real authors; or he 
might say that the testator and judges are authors whose meanings’ diverge.  This is an 
example of how a single inquiry approach can produce awkward circumlocutions. 
 43. It is conceivable that understandings of “coinciding” differ in England and the 
United States or have changed significantly since the case was decided. 




their approach, very few deaths coincide, and language in wills about 
deaths coinciding will rarely be effective.44
The majority’s approach possesses the merit of not requiring extrinsic 
evidence, but it turns out that Lord Denning’s competing approach does 
not require much of that either.  Denning looked at undisputed facts 
about the Rowlands’ lives; because he does not rely on any claims about 
personal peculiarities of theirs, his inference about Rowland’s sense of 
“coinciding” must be based on what a reasonable person in that situation 
would have understood.45  Although Denning did not rely on any 
disputed evidence about Rowland’s own sense of “coinciding,” a critic 
could complain that an approach that makes the writer’s own sense 
determinative could draw judges into just such evidence in future cases, 
unless judges imposed limits on what they would consider—disregarding 
potentially debatable evidence about what a single individual understood 
by his words.46
Another problem with Denning’s approach is its vagueness about what 
counts as “coinciding.”  Suppose Dr. Rowland died when the ship sank, 
but his wife swam to an uninhabited island with a fellow survivor, living 
two weeks before succumbing to her wounds.  Dr. Rowland probably would 
not have conceived “coinciding” as comfortably covering that situation, 
instead understanding the term to include a time element briefer than 
two weeks. 
In the actual circumstances of the case, a judge who used Rowland’s 
probable desires as a guide would reach the same practical conclusion as 
one who adhered to the words in the will as Rowland probably 
understood them.  But the island variation suggests how these two points 
of reference might diverge.  If a friend had posed that variation in advance, 
Rowland might have said, “Since my wife would have no ability to use 
my property, I’d rather have it go to my relatives, not hers.  But I see 
that our deaths wouldn’t really coincide.  Maybe I would need different 
language for that situation, but it is too remote to make redoing the will 
worthwhile.” 
If this would have been Dr. Rowland’s response, what was his 
 44. That Dr. Rowland could have used different language to cover the 
circumstance of death by shipwreck may also be urged in favor of the result, see Michael 
Albery, Coincidence and the Construction of Wills, 26 MOD. L. REV. 353, 363 (1963), 
but it seems unfair to interpret his will in light of his failure to use an alternative a lawyer 
might have recommended. 
 45. Alternatively, one might say that judges should ascribe the meaning that a 
reasonable person in the situation would want and understand.  In that event, whether 
Rowland himself paid attention to the language of his will would become irrelevant. 
 46. Albery, supra note 44, at 357–58, assumes that Lord Denning would not have 
allowed into evidence testimony concerning a conversation between the Rowlands about 
what they meant. 
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intention?  When he wrote the will he had no narrow intention about the 
island scenario; he did not consider it.  His understanding of the word 
“coinciding” was not broad enough to cover that possibility, but the 
overall purpose that led him to choose “coinciding” would have reached 
it.  Were a court faced with such a two week survival, victory for the 
husband’s relatives would depend on the judges using a particular 
component of Rowland’s intentions—his more general ones—to 
override his own sense of what the words he chose signified, as well as 
the general understanding of those words.  
Our analysis of Rowland reveals a number of possibilities concerning 
standards of interpretation, possibilities that arise in other areas in which 
legal texts are interpreted.  Courts might rely on: the general, or 
ordinary, sense of words and phrases, allowing greater or lesser attention 
to the context in which the words and phrases are used; the sense of 
individuals situated as was the writer; the writer’s own sense of the 
words he has employed; the writer’s specific intentions for dealing with 
a situation; his broader purposes in disposing of his estate; or his 
hypothetical intentions about what he would have understood or wanted 
if he had focused on the situation. 
If we could put aside all problems of evidence and convenient 
administration, there would be much to be said for trying to satisfy the 
testator’s dominant wishes.  But if the will is a result of compromise or 
agreement, we can see that it is the writer’s understanding that should 
count, if that differs from his wishes.  To concoct a bizarre hypothetical, 
suppose the Rowlands were aware just how narrowly previous decisions 
had interpreted “coinciding,” and Dr. Rowland suggested broadening 
that language to cover other situations where the spouse who survives 
does not live long enough to use the property of the spouse who died 
first.  Mrs. Rowland, also aware of the rule assuming survival of the 
younger, adamantly objected, reminding her husband of all the sacrifices 
she was about to make for him.  He quickly dropped the proposed 
change, silently hoping a court would give an unexpectedly broad 
reading to “coinciding,” if it ever came to that. If Dr. Rowland’s 
subjective intentions were to matter, here it would be his understanding 
of what his words meant, not his hopes about what judges might do.47
 47. Perhaps the hopes of a testatrix should prevail over her understanding if she 
misperceives the limits of what a will can do, she hopes her will can do more than she 
believes she has accomplished, she has managed to choose words that fit her hopes well, 
and it turns out those can be carried out consistently with the law of wills. 




Judges might pick one of the conceivable standards as an ultimate 
criterion for interpreting a will, making inquiries according to other 
standards only to assist them in reaching a conclusion about how to 
apply the ultimate criterion.  Thus, if Rowland’s probable sense of his 
words was the ultimate criteria, an idea of his general purposes might 
help inform what he meant by “coinciding.”  Alternatively, judges might 
regard more than one standard as of final significance, somehow 
resolving instances in which the standards yield competing answers.  For 
example, a court believing that it had strong reasons to fulfill a testator’s 
wishes and to give words their common meaning would determine in 
individual cases—in which answers under the two standards are not 
congruent—which considerations carry more weight. 
Figuring out whether a judge or scholar is thinking in terms of one 
final standard or several may not always be simple.  Writing about the 
Rowland case, Michael Albery remarks that all three judges agreed that 
the “proper object of inquiry on construction of a will is . . . . the 
objective meaning of the words as used by the particular testator.”48  
That definitely sounds like a single ultimate standard.  But Albery goes 
on to say that the factors determining interpretation of a crucial word are 
(1) its meaning as ordinarily used, (2) the context provided by the 
accompanying words of the will, (3) surrounding circumstances that help 
connect the will to the outside world, and (4) the inherent reasonableness 
of a possible interpretation.49  The “objective meaning” turns out to be 
the meaning the law will ascribe, consisting of an amalgam of the factors 
the law treats as relevant.50
According to a leading American treatise, “The primary purpose in 
construing a will is to determine the very disposition which the testator 
wanted to make, to determine if possible his actual intent rather than an 
intent presumed by law.”51  But it is the “testator’s intention as expressed 
in his will when read in the light of the surrounding circumstances and in 
view of the admissible evidence . . . .”52  “The question . . . before the 
mind of the court is not what should testator have meant to do or what 
words would have been better for testator to use, but what is the 
 48. Albery, supra note 44, at 358.  What the judges disagreed about, he claims, is 
“the extent to which and the means whereby it is permissible to divert a word from its 
ordinary meaning.”  Id. 
 49. Id. at 358–60.  Albery remarks that the weight attached to each ingredient is 
not “at the discretion of the court, but is governed by well-established principles.”  Id. at 
360.  But these principles do not tell us that the various ingredients lead to some singular 
sense of meaning (nor, I think, do they give us a precise ordering of criteria); rather they 
tell us what the courts will count as the meaning. 
 50. Id. at 358–60. 
 51. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 18, at 2. 
 52. Id. at 3–4. 
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reasonable meaning of the words which he has actually used.”53  Courts 
cannot rewrite wills to conform to presumed intentions.54  These various 
formulations point in different directions;55 they settle neither the degree 
to which a court will accede to a testator’s idiosyncratic formulations or 
correct his outright mistakes, nor what evidence they should consider.  
In wills, as in many branches of the law, “meaning” may come down to 
an uncomfortable combination of relevant factors. 
2.  Sources of Evidence 
Whatever standards of judgment they employ, courts might investigate 
every relevant source of evidence that could contribute to a decision 
under those standards, or they might impose limits.  Courts have traditionally 
assumed that if the text of a will has a plain meaning, they should not go 
beyond the text; and more generally courts have refused to consider 
what testators said at the time about what they were trying to do or how 
they understood particular words they used in the will.56  The barring of 
evidence of testators’ statements about their aspirations significantly 
restricts the field of information about their specific intentions.57
Why would anyone adopt such a restriction?  A major reason is 
evidentiary unreliability.58  Opportunities arise for outright fraud and 
honest disagreement about what the testator said at the time.  A related 
rationale concerns predictability in the interpretation of the language of 
 53. Id. at 44. 
 54. Id. at 32. 
 55. James Robertson sharply notes this problem.  See Robertson, supra note 3, at 1045, 
1065–66.  Robertson, a former judge on a state supreme court, has suggested that 
combining “internal and external standards . . . yield[s], at best, a forced and awkward 
fit.”  Id. at 1053. 
 56. Thus, one way to understand Rowland is that if a term has a standard meaning, 
a court will not pay attention to any evidence that the writer probably intended a 
different meaning. 
 57. If evidence were barred only when the meaning is regarded as plain, a more 
precise way to view the approach would be that plain meaning is the controlling legal 
standard; only if that fails do facts about the testator become legally relevant.  This 
nuance of conceptualization is one indication of how thin the line can become between a 
narrow standard of interpretation (plain meaning controls) and a constraint on sources of 
evidence (no way to show testator’s intention).  For an argument that restrictions on 
evidence in the early nineteenth century rendered statements about the relevance of 
subjective intentions of contracting parties misleading, see infra note 152. 
 58. Scott Jarboe provides one account of modern justifications.  Scott T. Jarboe, 
Comment, Interpreting a Testator’s Intent from the Language of Her Will: A Descriptive 
Linguistics Approach, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1365, 1373–75 (2002).  Jarboe recounts reasons 
for earlier English restrictions on external evidence. Id. at 1371–73. 




wills.  Further, the status of wills has often been regarded as a reason to 
avoid external evidence.  Crediting external remarks has been thought to 
violate the rule that a will’s provisions cannot be overthrown by contrary 
dispositions, oral or written, outside the will (or to fall too close to a 
violation of the rule to be allowed). 
When someone wants to dispose of her property by will, she must put 
her disposition in writing, sign the document, and have it attested by two 
or three witnesses; or (in many states) she must write the entire will in 
her own handwriting.59  Given other devices by which people pass money 
when they die—designating beneficiaries in insurance policies, retirement 
funds, and some kinds of bank accounts without having the forms 
witnessed60—one may make a strong argument that will formalities 
should be relaxed.  The Uniform Probate Code reduces statutory requirements 
for execution and also confers on courts a power to dispense with 
requirements if a proponent presents clear and convincing evidence of a 
testamentary intention.61  Nevertheless, most courts still apply requirements 
strictly.  If, for example, a signed document was undoubtedly meant to be a 
will but was not witnessed, most probate courts will not treat it as valid. 
Will formalities are thought to serve at least five purposes.62  One is 
evidentiary; the formalities help ensure that one can simply and confidently 
determine how a person wished to dispose of her property.63  The second 
purpose is cautionary.64  The ritual of making and signing a will, and 
having it witnessed, emphasizes to the writer the seriousness of what she 
does.  A will is not a casual offhand remark; it elicits careful deliberation 
and decision.  A third purpose is self-protective.65  The formalities help 
guard against a person’s being defrauded or unduly influenced into 
accepting a disposition she does not really want to make.  Finally, the 
formalities serve two channeling functions.  They allow courts to settle 
efficiently what disposition to make of an estate.66  They also help guide 
 59. See Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 
1071 (1996) (discussing “holographic wills”—entirely handwritten and signed by the 
testator—which are allowed in approximately twenty-nine jurisdictions). 
 60. For a discussion of will substitutes, see John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance 
with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 503–09 (1975); Nathaniel W. Schwickerath, 
Public Policy and the Probate Pariah: Confusion in the Law of Will Substitutes, 48 
DRAKE L. REV. 769 (2000). 
 61. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-502, 503 (1990). John H. Langbein earlier wrote 
favorably on a similar development in South Australia.  John H. Langbein, Excusing 
Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution 
in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1987). 
 62. See Langbein, supra note 60, at 491–98. 
 63. Id. at 492–93. 
 64. Id. at 494–96. 
 65. Id. at 496–97. 
 66. Id. at 493–94. 
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those who consult lawyers or look at will forms to accomplish their 
objectives.67  In addition to providing precise language with clear legal 
effect, lawyers can suggest previously unconsidered contingent possibilities 
and legal devices to allocate control of property and minimize tax 
burdens. 
A crucial question about interpreting wills is the import of the writing 
requirement.  We can quickly see why wills should not be open to 
challenge on the basis that their writers changed their minds between the 
time they made their wills and the time they died, as evidenced by oral 
statements.68  Signed and witnessed documents are much easier to 
authenticate than claimed oral remarks by a person who has died.69  The 
core of what is called the parol evidence rule is a principle of substantive 
law that other expressions will not be taken to supersede the terms of an 
authoritative written document.70  A will cannot be superseded by either an 
oral expression or a writing that is not formalized in the way a will must be. 
As Wigmore has emphasized, allowing evidence of what the testator 
meant in a will is not the same as allowing the will to be superseded; but 
many courts have taken the parol evidence rule to bar evidence of the 
writer’s statements about what she meant to do with her will.71  That a 
court is interpreting the will, not supplementing it, is clear if its inquiry 
is limited to what a testator aimed specifically to do with the language of 
his will—the inquiry in which Lord Denning engaged in Rowland.72
The two purposes of the writing requirement that might be compromised, 
were external evidence about a testator’s intention considered in respect 
to the will’s interpretation, are simplicity of administration and evidentiary 
reliability.  The more courts need to consider, the more complicated the 
process of settling wills can become.  Just how serious the risk of 
 67. Id. at 497–98. 
 68. It would be comforting to suppose that because anyone can change her will, the 
will almost certainly reflects her wishes up to the time of death.  But many people put off 
revising wills even after their wishes have changed; and death overtakes some procrastinators. 
 69. I pass over situations in which an oral statement might be irrefutably authentic, 
as when a person sends a videotape to all family members. 
 70. Wigmore emphasizes that the rule is properly seen as one of substantive law, 
not evidence.  WIGMORE, supra note 30, at § 2400.  If the rule is used to bar evidence of 
intent or of how a testator understood words that a court would consider relevant under 
its criteria of interpretation, then the rule operates as a genuine one of evidence. 
 71. See PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 18, at 39–44. 
 72. The line between interpretation and supplementation becomes thinner if the 
testator’s general intent, not revealed in the will itself but established by external evidence, 
is used to provide a specific disposition the testator did not conceive.  The following section 
provides an example of how this line can become elusive in relation to a contract. 




unreliability is depends heavily on the kinds of statements involved; 
claims about oral comments made to prospective beneficiaries are 
susceptible to fraud and distortion to a degree that is not true of more 
“objective” evidence of how a testator used terms in various contexts, 
such as letters, recordings, and diaries, other than his will.73
The purposes of cautioning, self-protection, and guidance that will 
formalities serve are not affected by techniques of interpretation.  Were 
courts to credit external evidence about what a writer meant in his will, 
that would not detract from the careful consideration he would give to 
what he wants to accomplish and how that can be done.74
One way to reflect on the evidence courts should allow for wills is to 
assess a radically inclusive approach suggested by Jane Baron.75  
Claiming that the law of wills pays too much attention to words and not 
enough to stories, she provides the example of her father’s will, which left 
his “personal property” to her and the rest of his estate to his wife, Baron’s 
stepmother.  Did he mean by “personal property” only tangible items like 
chairs and tables or intangible property like stocks and bank accounts? 
One might conceivably take Baron’s proposal in a highly revisionist 
way, to allow the father’s general wishes a kind of priority over the will 
itself; but it does not take too many conversations with members of the 
same family to realize that they can disagree sharply over a person’s 
comparative affections.  People represent themselves differently to different 
people, and perceptions of the same events vary widely.  A judge could 
find it hard to build a composite story from the stories a daughter and her 
stepmother would tell about her father.  If judges regarded wills as no 
more than helpful guides to wishes, their task would become nearly 
impossible, and the number of controverted cases would rise exponentially.  
Such a broad use of stories would undermine the choice someone has 
made to place his disposition in formal writing. 
The more modest and plausible use of the father’s story would be to 
illuminate what he meant by “personal property.”  The closer he was to 
his daughter, the more estranged from his wife, the more likely it was 
that he used the term expansively.  Although the court’s focus would 
remain on the will, the relevant evidence would still be very broad.  
Even if contestants told the truth as they understood it, competing claims 
about comparative affection could be personally divisive, as well as 
 73. See Jarboe, supra note 58, at 1388. 
 74. Similarly, a relaxation in will formalities does not deprive people of reason to 
have their wills written precisely, see Langbein, supra note 61, at 51–52; Emily Sherwin, 
Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The Search for a Compromise 
Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 453, 466–68 (2002). 
 75. Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42 DUKE L.J. 630,     
661–64 (1992). 
GREENAWALT NEW 6-6-05.DOC 6/13/2005  9:05 AM 
[VOL. 42:  533, 2005]  A Pluralist Approach to Interpretation 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 561 
 
troublesome for courts to evaluate.  There is powerful reason not to admit 
such personal accounts of the father’s general dispositions.  Evidence 
drawn from the will itself and undisputed objective circumstances (such 
as the Rowlands’ projected trip to the South Pacific) are less susceptible 
to distortion.  If Baron could show that her father in his business 
dealings typically used the terms “personal property” to include stocks 
and bank accounts, that would give credence to the conclusion that he 
meant this broader notion in his will.  The risk of admitting specific 
statements about the will’s contents would depend on the kinds of 
statements involved.  If her father wrote Professor Baron and her stepmother 
(with a copy to Baron) that Baron would receive his stocks that would be 
highly reliable.  Oral comments allegedly made to the person who would 
benefit would be unreliable.76  Leaving judges with a somewhat less rich 
picture of the aims of the testator is an acceptable price to pay for 
keeping out untrustworthy claims of oral statements and controverted 
and controversial testimony about the balance of someone’s affections. 
B.  Plain Meaning, Exceptions, and Alternatives 
One possible approach to standards of interpretation and sources is to 
make everything depend on the apparent clarity of a will’s language.  
When they find that a will has a plain meaning, judges have often barred 
any reliance on external sources that might establish a different meaning.77  
Modern courts would not use this rule to bar evidence of local or trade 
usages, but a court faithfully applying the rule in a case such as Rowland 
would not consider evidence that would establish a writer’s own special 
sense of words or his intent, unless the written words were ambiguous in 
context or vague in relation to some borderline situation. 
Legal scholars of the last century have not looked kindly on plain 
meaning rules, and leading modern scholars have supported a focus on 
the intent of a will’s author in preference to reliance on plain meaning.78  
Some scholars have regarded plain meaning rules as incoherent or based 
on a logical error.  Thus, Wigmore has said that the plain meaning rule 
 76. Ordinary rules barring hearsay evidence would reach some evidence of this 
sort, even without any special exclusion for the law of wills. 
 77. WIGMORE, supra note 30, at § 2461. 
 78. See, e.g., id. at § 2462; John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation 
of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change in Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 521, 522 (1982); Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Mistakes in Wills Resulting from Scriveners’ 
Errors: The Argument for Reformation, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (1990). 




rests on the fallacy that “there is or ever can be some one real or 
absolute meaning.”79  Adam Hirsch writes that each of us has his or her 
own idiolect, that words can have multiple meanings, and that the plain 
meaning rule is theoretically incoherent.80
Whatever misconceptions about language people may have entertained 
during the origins and development of the plain meaning rule, a defender 
of the rule need not assume that meanings are fixed and absolute.  He 
may acknowledge that community sense determines meaning, that 
meaning varies with context, and that not everyone shares exactly the 
same meanings.  All he need claim is that when certain words in context 
convey a meaning on which the vast majority of speakers of the language 
agree, that meaning is relevantly “plain.”81  In the law, meaning can also 
count as “plain” if legal tradition or legislation has established a definite, 
precise, meaning for particular words such as “heirs” that does not 
depend on popular usage. 
A plain meaning rule treats plain meaning as controlling, even if the 
speaker’s subjective meaning may differ.  When others rely on what a 
legal document says, giving substantial weight to the understandings of 
readers makes sense; but, if beneficiaries have only limited expectations 
based on the language of wills, and the main point of wills is to afford 
people wide discretion in how they wish to dispose of their property 
after death, reasons to privilege a general understanding of terms over 
that of the testator are much less powerful.82  Any justification for 
privileging general meaning in wills must lie mainly in the benefits of 
convenience, uniformity, and reliable evidence. 
To evaluate those benefits, we need to look more closely at when 
evidence of individual meanings or intent is permitted or not permitted 
under the plain meaning rule, and we also need to review some possible 
alternatives.  The rule does not apply if a will is ambiguous—if the words as 
applied to external circumstances do not clearly convey one meaning 
rather than another.  Most straightforwardly, words may be ambiguous 
on their face.  Suppose T leaves “my most beautiful painting to my daughter 
Ann.”  The words taken by themselves do not signify which of a number 
of paintings is meant.  Although historically, some courts refused to 
 79. WIGMORE, supra note 30, at § 2462 (citing Locke for the proposition that 
individuals signify different things by words). 
 80. Hirsch, supra note 59, at 1116–21. 
 81. I here put aside the possibility that a particular person’s usage is so well 
established that the meaning of his words can be plain even if others, including those in  
his circumstances, would not use words in that way.  Such a personalized version of 
meaning is not considered plain meaning in the law of wills. 
 82. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 18, at 8–9 explains that courts are more liberal 
about construing intent in wills than in deeds and that American courts are more liberal 
than are English ones. 
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accept evidence to resolve such patent ambiguities,83 regarding the terms 
as too indefinite to be applied, courts now will usually admit evidence to 
discern the writer’s intent.84
Evidence has consistently been allowed to resolve latent ambiguities, 
apparent only when the language of the will is applied to the testator’s 
property.85  If T leaves “my diamond necklace,” the direction is ambiguous 
if she owns two diamond necklaces.  Evidence may show which 
necklace she meant.86  Courts wanting to avoid unjust results will often 
strain to find ambiguity without explicitly abandoning the plain meaning 
rule.87
The crucial issue about plain meaning concerns claims about individual 
meanings, when no evidence of ambiguity exists except assertions about 
the writer’s particular understanding.  An example is a will that leaves 
property to “Mother.”  If the writer’s mother is alive when his will is 
written, the word has a plain meaning,88 and it does not refer to the 
writer’s wife.  Under a plain meaning rule, the wife would not be able to 
show that her husband referred to her as “Mother.”89  Suppose a widow 
offers disinterested witnesses who testify that her husband always referred 
to her in this way.  Might the husband not have realized that in his will, 
he should use formal designations, not intimate terms of reference?  A 
court might view the effort to get back to the husband’s individual 
meaning as fraught with difficulty. 
 83. WIGMORE, supra note 30, at § 2472. 
 84. See, e.g., Andrea W. Cornelison, Dead Man Talking: Are Courts Ready to Listen? 
The Erosion of the Plain Meaning Rule, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 811,  819–20 (2001).  
Some courts will admit extrinsic evidence, but not evidence of the testator’s intent.  Id. 
 85. Id. at 820–23. 
 86. This kind of uncertainty may be regarded as a separate category of 
“equivocation,” a description that “fits two or more external objects equally well. . . .”  
JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 437 (5th ed. 
1995). 
 87. According to Andrea Cornelison, supra note 84, at 824, “the language of 
ambiguity largely has swallowed the plain meaning rule . . . .” 
 88. I assume there is no complication about a birth mother and an adoptive mother. 
 89. ARNOLD DUNCAN MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES: BRITISH PRACTICE AND 
OPINIONS 175 (1938), refers to a will that said, “All for mother,” and the court allowed 
evidence that that was how he referred to his wife.  Perhaps it could be relevant that this 
usage is not entirely idiosyncratic.  Many husbands refer to their wives as “Mother” or 
“Mom” when talking to their children, and some address their wives directly in this way.  
Few would use these terms for their wives in a formal legal document, but if a writer’s 
actual mother had died before he wrote his will, it could appear likely that he meant to 
refer to his wife.  Some courts maintain a personal use exception to the plain meaning 
rule.  See Cornelison, supra note 84, at 825. 




But is a total bar on evidence of idiosyncratic understanding a wise 
response?  It may be better to indulge a strong assumption that words are 
meant in their ordinary sense, but to admit evidence of a different 
meaning, perhaps requiring the proponent of a special meaning to meet a 
high burden of proof.  When one looks at the range of cases in which 
“plain meaning” can produce unjust results, this possibility gains in 
attractiveness.  We can divide cases very roughly into those in which the 
testator has made an outright mistake and those in which the problem is 
less simple. 
One form of outright mistake is that the language of the will, even as 
understood by the testator, definitely fails to accomplish his purpose.  
Either he has made a slip in writing the will, or some failure occurs 
between his instructions to his lawyer and his signing of the will that 
both fail to catch. 
Some wills omit clearly intended provisions.  One provided that a 
daughter could receive a portion of the principal of Fund A, but not of 
Fund B, when she reached the age of forty, although other language in 
the will indicated that the aim was to allow her receipt of some of the 
principal of both funds.90  Extrinsic evidence showed that a typist had 
made an error.91  In another kind of case, a husband and wife read their 
respective wills carefully, but each ends up signing the other’s will.92
A somewhat different form of mistake involves terms with a precise 
legal significance and application that the testator does not recognize.  
Thus, one testatrix acting on her lawyer’s advice designated her “heirs at 
law,” not realizing that at her death, her aunt might be her sole heir, with 
priority over her cousins.93  In another case, the lawyer had used the term 
“heirs” after a woman had asked that the residue in her will go to her 
own blood relatives; in California the family of her late husband counted 
as half of her heirs.94
 90. In re Estate of Dorson, 196 N.Y.S.2d 344, 345–47 (Sur. Ct. 1959). 
 91. Id. at 346–47. 
 92. In one New York case, the court admitted the will the husband signed to 
probate and reformed it in accord with the provisions his wife had actually signed.  In re 
Snide, 418 N.E.2d 656, 656–58 (N.Y. 1981). 
 93. See Mahoney v. Grainger, 186 N.E. 86 (Mass. 1933) (relying on a will 
execution statute, the court refused to correct the apparent error).  I am not treating an 
idiosyncratic use of ordinary terms as a “mistake,” so long as the terms reflect the 
writer’s actual understanding and wishes, but one might say the writer is making a 
mistake in failing to adhere to general usage. 
 94. Estate of Taff, 133 Cal. Rptr. 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).  The court interpreted 
the will to carry out her intention.  Id. at 742.  It noted that the trial court properly 
considered evidence to create an ambiguity and to resolve it.  Id. at 741.  John Langbein 
and Lawrence Waggoner have remarked that “this way of stating the matter obliterates 
the fundamental distinction between ambiguity and mistake.”  Langbein & Waggoner, 
supra note 78, at 557–58.  (It does not necessarily follow that the court would have taken 
the same approach if the will had used words that the testatrix herself would have 
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Relatedly, a testator may misunderstand legal consequences, in a way 
that does not depend on the meaning of a single term.  In one case, a 
couple wanted their estates divided between their two families if neither 
of them or their children survived.95  Their lawyer wrote the wills to 
provide that the estates would be divided between the two mothers.96  
The wife’s mother, but not the husband’s, survived the couple, who died 
with their children in a hotel fire.97  According to ordinary legal 
principles, the wife’s mother would have taken everything.98   
Some mistakes concern the external world to which the will applies.  
The writer may fail to benefit a child because he mistakenly believes she 
has died.  Or he may make a mistake about how to describe a piece of 
property or about a name. 
With names, the writer often could not identify the mistake if he read 
his will very carefully, but he would recognize that he had picked the 
wrong name if the correct names of individuals or organizations were 
explained to him.  If no one exactly fits a name in the will, courts will 
consider evidence to resolve the latent ambiguity, but what if the will 
perfectly matches an actual person or organization?  One will contained 
a devise to Robert J. Krause (with his correct address); the testator did 
not know him, but Robert W. Krause was a long-time friend and 
employee.99  In a more piquant case, Nasmyth, a resident of Edinburgh,  
left a legacy to the “National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children.”100  It turned out that a society with just this name existed in 
London; the name of the analogous society in Edinburgh began with the 
word “Scottish.”  According to a handbook on legal construction, “a number 
of circumstances . . . rendered it highly probable that [he] would have 
preferred to extend his bounty to the Scottish Society.”101
Courts have strong reason to correct mistakes in wills.  Nasmyth 
realized did not accomplish her objectives if she had read the words over.) 
 95. Engel v. Siegel, 377 A.2d 892, 893 (N.J. 1977). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. In Engel, the Supreme Court of New Jersey followed the couple’s intent and 
treated the mothers as representatives of the wider families.  Id. at 896. 
 99. In re Estate of Gibbs, 111 N.W.2d 413 (Wis. 1961).  The testator had 
apparently looked in the telephone book for his friend, and had put down the middle 
initial and address of the stranger.  Id. at 416.  Believing that the proof established the 
mistake to a high degree of certainty, the court corrected it.  Id. at 418. 
 100. Michael Hancher, Dead Letters: Wills and Poems, 60 TEX. L. REV. 507, 515 
(1982). 
 101. Id.  The House of Lords gave the money to the English organization. 




thought he had used the name of the society in Scotland;102 the 
California testatrix thought that her “heirs” were her blood relatives.103  
Why should courts not give effect to words as the words are understood 
by those who write them, if there is powerful, acceptable, evidence that 
this understanding deviates from general usage?104  The result should be 
the same if a lawyer tells the testator that he is using words he won’t 
bother to explain that will do the job the testator wants.105
If we focus on fair treatment for the testator, it also makes sense for 
courts to correct mistakes about which words the will contains.  If it is 
clear that the testator wanted the beneficiary to receive principal from 
Fund B, or to sign the will drawn up for himself, not his wife, or to leave 
money to his friend Robert W. Krause, a court should rectify the 
mistake.  Courts could require that evidence of a mistake be, as it was in 
the Fund B case, from within the will,106 but sometimes external evidence 
can be reliable and powerful, as with the written donation to Robert J. 
Krause,107 even though nothing in the will itself sounds an alarm.108
A tentative conclusion that courts should correct evident mistakes 
does not resolve what standard they should employ in interpreting wills, 
what evidence they should consider that a mistake has been made, and 
what burden of proof they should place on the person who is urging the 
existence of mistake.  The approach most influentially urged in the last 
two decades is that courts should inquire about the actual intent of 
testators, that any evidence, or at least any evidence not barred by 
ordinary principles of evidence, should be permitted, but that the 
proponent of mistakes of fact or law should have to establish the 
mistakes by clear and convincing evidence.109
 102. Hancher, supra note 100. 
 103. Estate of Taff, 133 Cal. Rptr. 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). 
 104. In the National Society case, there is a further argument that in context the title 
of the organization meant generally what Nasmyth assumed.  Someone who says in New 
York that he is to get a dog at the S.P.C.A. means the American S.P.C.A., although the 
organization with the formal title Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals is in 
England.  The National Society issue is more complicated because the title is in a formal 
document, and some people living in Edinburgh might choose to donate to the 
organization in England. 
 105. That is, it should not matter whether the lawyer says, “I’ve used ‘heirs’ to 
benefit your blood relatives,” or, “I’ve used technical language to do what you wish.” 
 106. In re Estate of Dorson, 196 N.Y. S. 2d 344, 345–47. (Sur. Ct. 1959). 
 107. In re Estate of Gibbs, 111 N.W.2d 413 (Wis. 1961). 
 108. I treat this names case as one of a mistake about what words appeared in the 
will, but, if the testator did not know his friend’s middle initial or address, one might say 
he chose the words he wanted and that his mistake was about the individual to whom 
those words referred.  On my analysis, which of these two characterizations is preferable 
does not matter. 
 109. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 78.  Robertson, supra note 3, at 1089, 
points out that these authors would impose a less exacting standard of proof for clerical 
errors. 
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We shall look at two recent challenges to this combination of elements, 
both of which agree that a strategy of interpretation should correct 
obvious mistakes.  James L. Robertson offers an objective approach to 
interpretation, based on his experience as a judge on a state supreme 
court and heavily influenced by Oliver Wendell Holmes.110  He suggests 
that discerning the actual intent of a testator many years ago is 
commonly an impossible inquiry.111  Further, given the influence of 
various aids to interpretation that are external to the donor, it is “forced 
and awkward” to combine internal and external standards.112
In contrast to a major thesis of this essay and much other writing about 
interpretation, Robertson suggests that the same objective approach can 
apply to all aspects of legal interpretation.113  According to him, “We do 
and should seek circumstanced external meaning, not by invading the 
mind of the person who made the donative transfer, but by referring to 
the hypothetical, yet reasoned, intent of an external character, an 
imagined semi-sovereign donor (‘SSD’) . . . .”114  A court should ask what 
the words of the document would mean to a “normal hearer of English 
seeing them in the circumstances in which they are spoken.”115  Robertson 
is open to courts considering external evidence, including the lawyer’s 
testimony in one of the “heirs” cases that the testatrix did not want her 
money to go to her one aunt rather than her twenty-five cousins.116
Just how Robertson’s approach differs from an inquiry about subjective 
intent is elusive, in part because the exact range of evidence he would 
allow about circumstances is not clear.  As a hypothetical in which a 
court would not, and should not, deviate from the words of the will, he 
suggests an instance in which a father’s will leaves a Chickering piano to 
one daughter (Maria), although he meant to leave it to another daughter 
(Christina).117  If Dad had written both daughters many times that 
Christina was to get the piano and Maria the painting, if his lawyer’s 
 110. Robertson, supra note 3, at 1045 n.4. 
 111. Id. at 1045–49. 
 112. Id. at 1053. 
 113. Id. at 1047. 
 114. Id. at 1055.  See also Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 
IOWA L. REV. 611 (1988), who suggests that courts “impute” intent.  Id. at 612.  It is not 
clear how far imputed intent will ordinarily diverge from a probabilistic judgment about 
actual intent, although Fellows does say that testators do not have intents about matters 
they did not consider. 
 115. Robertson, supra note 3, at 1076. 
 116. Id. at 1096–99. 
 117. Id. at 1061. 




notes reflected that intent, if Maria was an artist who despised piano 
music, a court employing an actual intent approach might decide that 
Christina should receive the piano.  In principle, this case does not seem 
different from the Robert Krause problem.118  Of course, people rarely 
leave money to strangers with names almost like those of good friends 
they fail to benefit, and people often leave pianos to daughters.  But one 
can load the circumstances heavily so a gift of the piano to Maria seems 
highly implausible.  If an external circumstanced approach would correct 
the gift to Robert J. Krause,119 why could it not correct the gift to Maria? 
And how are we to regard situations in which the testator uses terms in 
an unusual way?  A normal speaker of English would not use terms in 
that way, but ordinary speakers of English can understand from an 
enriched picture of circumstances that another person is using terms in a 
nonstandard way.120  If all circumstantial evidence is admitted, including 
evidence about the inclinations and idiosyncrasies of the testator, it is 
doubtful if a judge employing Robertson’s objective approach would 
reach practical results different from one asking about actual intent.  She 
would, of course, not admit to making an uncertain determination about 
probable intent; she would be able to say instead that she adopts the 
conclusion that the normal speaker of English who matched the will to 
circumstances would reach. 
Emily Sherwin has urged that using a standard of clear and convincing 
evidence for proof of testamentary intent by someone who has failed to 
comply with will formalities does not achieve a rational compromise 
between formality and adjudicative justice.121  Her basic argument is that 
a mistaken failure to recognize testamentary intent is as bad as a 
mistaken recognition of testamentary intent when it is absent.  Using a 
standard of clear and convincing evidence, rather than the ordinary civil 
standard of preponderance of evidence, will result in a greater number of 
misjudgments.  Sherwin does not herself extend her reasoning to issues 
of interpretation,122 but her challenge requires us to examine carefully 
possible reasons for a standard of clear and convincing evidence in that 
context. 
One may think of such a standard partly as a caution against weighing 
certain kinds of evidence too highly.  Some years ago, and perhaps up to 
 118. See In re Estate of Gibbs, 111 N.W.2d 413 (Wis. 1961). 
 119. I am not certain Robertson would correct that gift; if he would not, his 
approach can be faulted on that ground. 
 120. An extreme illustration is when a listener understands that the speaker grossly 
misunderstands the meaning of a word in a foreign language. 
 121. Sherwin, supra note 74, at 473–74. 
 122. But see Robertson, supra note 3, at 1084–85. Although rejecting a heightened 
standard of proof, Robertson says his approach would be inhospitable to claims of 
mistake based on the hearsay testimony of drafting lawyers.  Id. at 1102. 
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the present, the Princeton philosophy department did not interview 
persons they were considering for appointments.  The rationale was that 
the members recognized they would give undue importance to personal 
impressions.  A heightened standard of proof might be a restraint on a 
judge giving too much weight to present testimony in relation to what 
can be discerned from the will itself.  The standard can also operate as 
an exercise in tact.  A judge need not say he thinks someone is probably 
lying, only that the proponent has failed to overcome the burden of 
producing clear and convincing evidence. 
Perhaps most important, when claimed mistakes are at issue, misjudgments 
in one direction seem more tolerable than misjudgments in the other.  If 
a testator or his lawyer has messed up, holding him to what the will’s 
language actually conveys may be harsh; but it is not as bad as 
rewarding fraudulent claims of mistake.  Many assertions of mistake that 
are not obviously correct may be true in fact, but some may be the fruit 
of outright fraud.  The clear and convincing evidence standard is a 
protection against such fraud succeeding. 
When measured against these various critiques, both an inquiry that 
focuses on actual intent, at least as to matters as to which the testator 
almost certainly had a definite intent, and a standard of clear and 
convincing evidence, seem appropriate. 
Courts have commonly said that they can construe wills, but not 
reform them to correct mistakes by adding new provisions.123  However, 
distinguishing construction from addition is hard to do when a name is 
substituted, or a will the husband signed is given the terms of the will his 
wife mistakenly signed.  Langbein and Waggoner argue persuasively that 
many American decisions have eroded any line between construction 
and reformation (or addition), and that courts should drop the pretense of 
“no-reformation.”124  Rather, they should alter explicit terms when they 
have clear and convincing evidence that the terms do not reflect the 
intentions of the testator.125
How far should courts be guided by a testator’s intent when something 
more complex than a mistake is involved?  When a general intent in a 
will, say to provide equally for different branches for a family, conflicts 
with more specific language about a disposition, courts rightly seek to 
 123. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 78, at 521–23. 
 124. Id. at 566. 
 125. Id. at 568. 




give effect to the paramount intention.126  These situations usually arise 
when the testator has failed to foresee the contingency that actually 
occurs. 
Courts will not alter specific language merely because it appears to be 
in some tension with a testator’s overall objectives, judged from the 
body of the will or external evidence.  Wills are not public-regarding in the 
manner of statutes; their writers are free, within bounds, to be arbitrary 
or capricious.  They need not be consistent in fulfilling purposes outsiders 
can identify.  Judges have no occasion to substitute their judgments for 
what the writers have specifically provided.127
It is conceivable that a writer’s intent for a specific situation and his 
sense of his words may fly apart.  Suppose that Dr. Rowland picked 
“coinciding,” imagining that it covered shipwrecks in which his wife and 
he would die together.  In most circumstances, the two would die seconds or 
a few minutes apart.  Dr. Rowland loosely assumed that the term would 
be adequate even if the deaths were a half hour apart, but if he had 
focused carefully on that question, he would have acknowledged that 
deaths a half hour apart do not coincide.  Here, his specific intent about a 
situation would not fit his reflective sense of his own words, and yet he 
has not exactly made a mistake.  In the absence of a mistake, a court is 
highly unlikely to have sufficient evidence to conclude that a writer’s 
own sense of the words she uses fails to conform to her specific intent. 
A more likely possibility is that a testator’s general intent will seem 
frustrated by a specific disposition, even though the general intent is not 
directly provided in the will itself.  One might view the Rowlands’ 
circumstances in this way if the wife survived too long to make the 
deaths coincide (by any understanding), but not long enough to make 
any use of her husband’s property.  Courts do not treat wills “liberally” 
in such instances; they do not fulfill assumed general purposes by 
disregarding specific provisions; but if a court can develop a clear sense 
of the objectives of the writer, perhaps it should regard itself as free to 
provide dispositions such as saving taxes that reach beyond the language 
of the will, but would certainly be preferred by the testator.128
C.  Interpretation, General Assumptions, and Public Policy 
I have, thus far, largely omitted one significant topic, interpretation in 
 126. See PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 18, at 88–89. 
 127. An exception involves the wills of people who have become incompetent.  
Then the argument is strong that courts should be able to reform their terms to carry out 
their objectives.  See Fellows, supra note 114, at 621–26. 
 128. See id. at 613 (proposing that courts should reform wills to achieve competent 
estate planning). 
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light of general assumptions and public policies.  Statutes constrain 
testators to a limited extent, requiring, for example, that spouses receive 
a substantial share; but beyond these restraints, various judicial and 
statutory principles of interpretation may affect how a will is construed.  
In circumstances of doubt, a court interprets a will to do what most 
people would want129 and in a manner that reflects ideas of desirable 
distribution.  Courts assume that most people do not wish to disinherit 
their children and that they wish equality of distribution for heirs of 
equal degree.130  If a will leaves the matter in doubt, it will be interpreted 
not to disinherit and to provide equality.  But, these interpretive 
principles go beyond generalizations about likely wishes; they reflect a 
social sense of desirable distribution.131  Thus, it has been said, “Every 
reasonable construction in the will must be made in favor of the heir at 
law; and he can be disinherited only by words which provide that effect 
clearly and necessarily. . .”132
In all areas of law, judges interpret in light of likely and accepted 
behavior.  Because of the freedom of the writers of wills, there may be less 
room for public policy to affect interpretation here than elsewhere;133 
nonetheless, judges properly give some more weight to appropriate 
standards of behavior than a pure estimate of the testator’s probable 
intentions might warrant.  Thus, given the policy that caring for children 
is desirable, a court may construe an unclear will to do that, even if the 
balance of probabilities suggests that the testator wished otherwise. 
IV.  CONTRACTS 
The law of contracts is a major part of modern private law, and 
scholars in the United States have devoted extensive attention to the 
law’s treatment of contracts.  The basic questions about contract 
interpretation are similar to those concerning wills.  How far should 
courts be guided by objective meaning, how far by the subjective intent 
of the parties?  How general or contextual should objective meaning be 
taken to be?  When should courts “write in” terms that parties have 
 129. Id. 
 130. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note18, at 90–91, 111. 
 131. Fellows, supra note 114, at 613. 
 132. PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 18, at 111. 
 133. However, some contracts scholars argue that courts should give effect to what 
the parties wanted or would have wanted over any considerations of public policy they 
were at liberty to disregard.  See infra notes 213–14 and accompanying text. 




failed to supply, a power that is quite limited for wills, and how should 
courts go about that task?  If various contractual provisions point in 
different directions, should a court give each its apparent meaning, even 
at the cost of an unwieldy totality, or bend the language of some terms to 
make the whole contract work well?  What evidences of meaning should 
courts allow?  Should courts assign meaning to contracts based on public 
policy, rather than the apparent significance of words or the intent of 
parties, if the explicit terms are unenforceable or seem to require actions 
that are permitted but generally disfavored, in the manner of disinheriting 
one’s children? 
Should the answers to these proceeding questions depend on the 
expressed or probable wishes of the parties about how courts should 
interpret their contracts?  Should strategies of interpretation vary according 
to the nature of the parties and the contracts they have made? 
Beyond the obvious point that contracts, unlike wills, are subscribed 
to by at least two persons, contracts differ from wills in usually being 
performed without legal officials playing any role.  In contrast to statutes 
and constitutional norms, contracts are formulated to achieve private 
objectives, not to set rules for public life.  Although many contracts involve 
three or more parties, we shall concentrate on the common written 
contract between two persons, or two companies, or one company and 
one person.  Most of the discussion proceeds without distinguishing 
among kinds of contracts, although we shall examine some proposals by 
scholars that how judges interpret contracts should depend on their 
subject matter and on the sophistication of the parties, that, for example, 
prenuptial agreements should be regarded differently from sales 
contracts, and contracts between experienced business firms differently 
from contracts between individuals.134
We shall not touch, except in passing, disputes that arise over whether 
the parties have entered into contractual relations and over what the 
bargained terms of a contract are. 
A.  Basic Issues of Interpretation: Objective v. Subjective                             
and General v. Contextual 
We saw in connection with wills that if courts could reliably and 
easily know the specific intentions of testators, fulfilling those intentions 
would be desirable; and we considered arguments that courts should, 
 134. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of 
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003).  See also Robert Childres & Stephen J. Spitz, 
Status in the Law of Contracts, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1972) (arguing that courts take 
categories of contracts and parties into account sub silentio in deciding whether to use 
the parol evidence rule). 
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nevertheless, focus on general meanings of terms, because discerning 
particular intentions is difficult and because allowing individual 
understanding to trump objective meaning encourages sloppy drafting, 
temptations to lie, and costly litigation.  Placing a heavy burden of proof 
on someone who claims that a will was intended to have an application 
different from its apparent terms seemed a better judicial answer to these 
worries than imposing rigid restraints on evidence of what the testator 
intended by the terms of her will. 
The analogous problems in contracts are similar but more complicated,  
because contexts may be richer and more variable, because the people 
involved may have had different understandings of what terms signified 
or different perceptions of what terms the contract contained, and because 
one party may realistically have been much more the author of terms than 
the other.  Unlike the writer of a will, contractual parties are available to 
testify about what they intended, but when their relationship has frayed 
to the degree that brings them to court, each party’s report of what he 
believed is likely to be unreliable and self-serving. 
The typical problem of ignorance about terms looks considerably 
different in contracts than it does in wills.  The actual writer of a will, 
often a lawyer, is trying to carry out the desires of one person.  Contracts 
involve bargains.  Better terms for one side are worse terms for the 
other.  Many contracts formed between large companies and individual 
purchasers (or users) are composed of forms that the individual must 
sign if she wishes to make a deal.  Backs of forms may contain terms 
highly favorable to the company printed in small letters.  Only an extremely 
conscientious (or compulsive) consumer reads through all these terms, 
let alone understands their significance; indeed it would often be 
irrational for the consumer to take the time and effort required to read 
and understand terms that are highly unlikely ever to make a difference.  
Courts and legislatures must decide whether such terms will have legal 
effect. 
A related problem that arises for contracts, but not interpretation of 
wills, statutes, or constitutions, is that parties may believe their relations 
will not be governed by the terms of the written contract, but rather by 
principles of fair dealing.135  Even a party aware of some unfavorable 
 135. See Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and 
Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1765–66 (1997).  Peter Linzer, The Comfort 
of Certainty: Plain Meaning and the Parol Evidence Rule, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 806 
n.33 (2002), notes a lease he signed that required window curtains to have a white 




term may not believe her contracting partner will rely upon it.  Suppose 
a salesman explains carefully that if you have a problem with the 
television set you are about to buy, the sales agreement provides you 
must seek redress from the manufacturer, not the store.  You understand 
perfectly well but assume, nevertheless, that if your television fizzles 
when you turn it on for the first time, the store will take it back and give 
you another.  Your understanding of fair business practice differs from 
what you know are the written terms of your agreement.  Whether judges 
should give effect to such understandings is a substantial question.136
Yet another difference between wills and some contracts concerns the 
wishes of their authors about techniques of interpretation.  Each writer of 
a will is going to have her will interpreted only once.  From her point of 
view, the best form of interpretation is the one which best promises to 
carry out the aims of her will.137  For certain kinds of contracts, such as 
prenuptial agreements, the considerations are similar.  But business 
firms entering a large number of contracts in which they will be both 
buyers and sellers may well prefer a less expensive interpretive approach 
that will work best for them over the long run.  If they estimate that they 
will be winners as often as losers when courts “get it wrong”, they may 
prefer that courts interpret in an inexpensive, uncomplicated manner.  
Employing such an analysis, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott argue that 
business firms dealing with each other should be able to get the standards of 
interpretation they want.  Instead of seeking a “correct” approach to 
interpreting contracts, courts should treat the parties as sovereign about 
interpretation, adopting the “interpretive style parties [would typically] 
want courts to use when attempting to find the correct answer.”138  Most 
firms, Schwartz and Scott claim, will commonly prefer an objective 
“textual” approach that considers little, if any, extrinsic evidence.139
backing; he relied on the manager’s assurance that “they don’t enforce that rule,” but, as 
a contracts teacher, realized he was depending on the landlord’s grace.  One can imagine 
an analogy for administrative or legislative regulations when a person subject to the 
regulations assumes that their strict terms will not be enforced, and practice supports that 
assumption. 
 136. According to Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol 
Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 181 (1965), assertions that the written words do 
not manifest an actual understanding are not “interpretation[s]” of the written words.  A 
claim of that sort may be one for reformation or some other remedy.  Id. at 174–75. 
 137. More precisely, the degree of risk of serious failure would be relevant.  Also, 
the projected cost of litigation could count, but not many testators would choose what 
would otherwise be a less desirable strategy of interpretation in order to save their estate 
money that might be spent on litigation costs. 
 138. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 134, at 569. 
 139. Id. at 544–49, 584–94.  Avery Katz has suggested the difficulty of generalizing 
about the interpretive strategy parties will want courts to use; the traditional scholarly 
approach “founders on a lack of information about the likely consequences of formal and 
substantive modes of interpretation.”  Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and 
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The fact that parties usually comply with contracts on their own can 
affect desirable methods of interpretation in litigated cases.  If courts 
interpret particular terms in the same fashion, parties will be able to 
gauge more accurately how they will be treated, and this degree of 
predictability may reduce litigation.  Thus, systemic considerations like 
those that apply to standard form wills favor interpreting standard form 
contracts “objectively,” so their terms will always mean the same thing.  
But it may be countered that parties will be more secure and less likely 
to litigate if they realize they will be held to ordinary trade usages and 
fair practices. 
1.  Objective and Subjective Elements 
If we put aside system-wide concerns and ask what are the fairest and 
most desirable standards of interpretation for the parties to a contract, 
and we assume both that a court (with or without a jury) can accurately 
assess each party’s understanding at acceptable expense and that the 
parties have not intended interpretation that makes their specific 
understandings irrelevant,140 the answer, across a range of cases, is a mix 
of objective and subjective elements. 
A party’s subjective intentions may diverge from the objective 
significance of the written contract if the writing contains an error in one 
of the terms (or in punctuation), or the party is unaware of terms, or the 
party understands the terms differently from their most plausible 
meaning from an objective standpoint. 
The error case is simple.  S agrees to sell her painting to B for $1000.  
When writing up the contract, S mistakenly adds an extra zero, so the 
contract reads $10,000.  Because S is a new painter, whose work has no 
established market value, the error is not obvious from the face of the 
contract plus external facts (other than the parties’ expressed intentions).  
If both parties agreed the painting was to sell for $1000, fairness calls for 
Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 538 (2004).  See also 
William J. Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 
971, 973, 991–1004, who urges both that the needed empirical evidence for a move 
toward formalism is lacking and that such an approach could have counterproductive 
effects on the behavior of many parties. 
 140. Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, The Plain Meaning Rule, and the 
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 568–73 (1998), 
discusses parties who fear that judges will err or that litigation will become too 
expensive, and consciously desire that courts not undertake inquires about their 
subjective understanding.  See also Schwartz & Scott, supra note 139, at 584–90. 




that price, the price for which the parties bargained, despite the $10,000 
in the written contract. 141
What if parties have different understandings of what the terms of a 
written contract should be, so that one party (honestly) thinks a mistake 
has been made and the other party (honestly) believes the written terms 
accurately reflect the agreement, or one party is ignorant of a term the 
other knows is in the contract?  If the two parties are equally situated, 
and if neither has an advantage in sophistication or bargaining power, a 
court should enforce the written terms.  A person should be able to rely 
on a contract’s terms without having to worry that the other party is 
under a misconception about what they are.  (Matters are different when 
the terms are in form contracts and in fine print; then a party who has 
written the form is under some responsibility to meet likely misperceptions 
of the other about what the terms are.) 
In the more interesting case, no one has made a mistake in writing 
down the terms of the contract, but at least one party understands the 
terms differently from what an objective reading would suggest.  (In a 
much more rare case that we will not consider, the parties have different 
understandings of some term, and neither understanding is more 
reasonable than the other.) 
As we saw with respect to wills, whereas a subjective approach is 
necessarily individual—its application depending on what specific 
persons (probably) believed—an “objective” approach may be more or 
less contextual.  The “objective theory” of contracts is sometimes 
conceived as taking terms in a general way that abstracts from the details 
of any particular contractual relationship.142  But if the key to an 
objective approach is a reliance upon external manifestations and 
events,143 an approach that asks what terms probably mean when used by 
people with the particular backgrounds and interactions of the parties 
can be “objective.”  That is, the terms would mean what a reasonable 
person aware of all the relevant circumstances would assume they mean 
in context. 
In fact, exactly how to draw the line between what counts as objective 
and what counts as subjective is not so simple.  Whether, for practical 
purposes, a standard that is apparently subjective reaches beyond a 
 141. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Mistake in Contract Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1575, 
1610 (2003), writing of mistranscriptions as mistakes that do “not affect the terms of the 
bargain.”  These fall within a broader category of what he calls mechanical errors, for 
which a party should obtain relief, except insofar as the other party relied reasonably.  Id. 
at 1584-1611. 
 142. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. 
REV. 1107, 1108–10 (1984). 
 143. For this notion to be meaningful, external events cannot include mental states, 
and they probably cannot include many statements about one’s mental states. 
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contextualized objective approach depends heavily on just what evidence 
is admissible.  Joseph Perillo has noted that in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries when some judges and text writers suggested 
that the crucial inquiry concerned subjective understanding, parties were 
not allowed to testify.144  Thus, the main sources of evidence that the 
parties’ subjective understanding differed from a contextual objective 
understanding were unavailable.  The crucial practical question may be 
which among many evidences about the meaning of contractual terms 
will be admitted, and what weight these various evidences will be given.  
With contracts as well as wills, the chance of a discrepancy between the 
actual subjective understanding of both parties and the objective 
meaning of the terms they choose decreases as the evaluation of 
“objective” meaning becomes less general and more contextual. 
Let me illustrate some of these issues with the imaginary contract that 
a Croatian soccer star, Ivo Planić, signed to play for an American team, 
the Metro Stars, “during its season.”  Understanding that Ivo will not be 
with the team during the weeks of training and exhibition games that 
precede the regular season, the team has agreed to pay half of his salary 
even if he is injured before he joins it.  When Ivo breaks his leg in a 
European game that takes place after the Metro Stars has begun training, 
the team claims it owes him no money, because he breached the contract 
by not showing up at training camp.  The judge concludes that the 
standard meaning of “during its season” includes training camp and 
exhibition games, but the judge also concludes that both parties 
understood the term differently here.145
In this situation, that is, when the parties have had a common 
understanding, implementing that understanding is the fair approach.  
What other parties might mean when they employ the same terms is 
irrelevant.146  Many modern courts do pay attention to the actual intent 
of the parties,147 an approach straightforwardly provided under the 
 144. Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation 
and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 443–44 (2000). 
 145. I do not discuss just whose understanding counts for a large firm, or for anyone 
who is represented by a lawyer, a problem that resembles somewhat the discerning of 
legislative intent in statutory cases.  But if people choose to have lawyers represent them 
in contract negotiations, they are ordinarily bound to the lawyers’ understandings. 
 146. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE 
L.J. 939, 949–51 (1976). 
 147. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Expression Rules in Contract Law and Problems of 
Offer and Acceptance, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1127, 1133–34 (1994); Farnsworth, supra note 
146, at 949–51.  But see Posner, supra note 140, at 534–40 (reporting that some courts 




Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 201(1), which says: “Where 
the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or 
a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning.”148
What reasons might a court have to interpret the term “during its 
season” according to what most people, or most people in the soccer 
business, or a reasonable person, would understand?  One might believe 
that figuring out what individual parties actually meant is too difficult, 
that adopting a generalized objective approach reduces incentives of 
parties to lie and even might match actual intentions better in most 
instances than an approach that tries to determine individual understandings 
directly.149  But let us assume here that the team president and Ivo told 
reporters after the signing that he would not have to report prior to the 
regular season.  In that event, an uncontextualized objective approach 
could not reduce the likelihood of error about the actual understandings 
of these parties. 
A court might, instead, rely on a conceptual argument that the 
meaning of a contract does correspond with what its terms would convey 
in common usage or to reasonable observers.  In what is sometimes 
called the classical conception of contracts, various writings may seem 
to reflect such a view.  In one of his famous comments about contracts, 
Oliver Wendell Holmes suggested that the law does not concern itself 
with the actual mental states of individuals: 
[N]o one will understand the true theory of contract . . . until he has understood 
that all contracts are formal, that the making of a contract depends not on the 
agreement of the two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets 
of external signs,—not in the parties’ having meant the same thing but on their 
having said the same thing.150
continue to apply what he calls a “hard” version of the parol evidence rule, according to 
which they exclude extrinsic evidence of prior negotiations and rely on the writing, 
unless the writing on its face is incomplete or ambiguous or a party claims a bargaining 
defect such as fraud or mistake). 
 148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(1) (1981).  This approach 
differs from the more objective one of the first Restatement.  For integrated contracts, its 
standard was “the meaning that would be attached . . . by a reasonably intelligent person” 
knowing the circumstances.  RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 230 (1932).  For unintegrated 
contracts, the meaning was what “the party making the manifestations should reasonably 
expect that the other party would give to them . . . .”  Id. at § 233. 
 149. In Steuart v. McChesney, 444 A.2d 659, 662 (Pa. 1982), the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania noted that the plain meaning rule “has been supported as generally best 
serving the ascertainment of the contracting parties’ mutual intent.” 
 150. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464 
(1897).  Perillo, supra note 144, at 474–76, writes that Holmes followed the lead of some 
courts in adopting an objective approach.  Holmes propounded a similar objective 
approach to virtually all branches of law.  Id.  Citing Holmes’s The Common Law, 
Eisenberg remarks that for some proponents of the classical model, it may “have 
reflected a broader program in which a single norm could generate all legal rules: Actors 
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Learned Hand, one of our most distinguished appellate judges, put it 
colorfully: 
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, 
intent of the parties . . . .  If . . . it were proved by twenty bishops that either 
party, when he used the words, intended something else than the usual meaning 
which the law imposes upon them, he would still be held . . . .”151
According to E. Allan Farnsworth, this fully objective approach to the 
meaning of contractual language arose in the late nineteenth century in 
response to expressions that contracts require a “meeting of the minds.”152  
Sweeping formulations of the objective approach may be understood as 
responsive to overstated notions about “the meeting of minds,” and as 
attempts to render law more scientific,153 rather than as refined 
evaluations of just when subjective intent should matter. 
Any defense of an objective approach cast in terms of conceptual 
necessity would be misconceived.  Interpreters face no logical compulsion 
to adopt an objective approach toward the meaning of texts.  If two friends 
exchanging informal promises have a shared sense of meaning, they will 
be guided by that, not some objective meaning.  The law of contracts can 
adopt the same perspective. 
must conform their activity to the conduct one could reasonably expect of the average 
person.”  Eisenberg, supra note 142, at 1108–09. 
 151. Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) aff’d, 231 U.S. 
50 (1913).  Hand’s quote does make an exception for cases of “mutual mistake, or 
something else of the sort,” but that apparently refers to mutual mistake about the subject 
of the contract, not about the significance of terms.  Id.  Lawrence Friedman has written, 
“‘Pure’ contract doctrine is blind to details of subject matter and person. . . .  Contract 
law is abstraction—what is left in the law relating to agreements when all particulars of 
person and subject-matter are removed.”  LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN 
AMERICA 20–24 (1965). 
 152. Farnsworth traces this subjective theory back to 1551, Farnsworth, supra note 
146, at 943, and notes that it “accorded well with the ‘will theory’ of contracts which 
attained hegemony on the nineteenth century . . . .”  Id. at 945.  Farnsworth goes on to 
say, “[n]o responsible authority seems ever to have suggested that the process of 
interpretation deals only with those terms on which there was a meeting of the minds at 
the time of agreement.”  Id.  Joseph Perillo, supra note 144, at 435, 443–44, emphasizes 
the objective elements in contract interpretation from the earliest times, and notes that 
the inability of parties to testify before the mid-nineteenth century undercut the practical 
relevance of comments that subjective understanding was the guide to meaning. 
 153. See Eisenberg, supra note 142, at 1108. 




Holmes’s objectivist stance was grounded in a utilitarian concern 
about a well-functioning legal system;154 and those who now support a 
similar approach defend it on the basis that contracts will be better 
written and more economically or faithfully enforced if courts stick with 
objective meaning.155  One might favor judges disregarding the possibility 
that both parties shared a meaning that deviates from a general one, if 
one thought that possibility was infrequently realized. 
We can conceive various approaches to deal with the problem of 
uncertainty about the actual subjective intentions of one or both parties.  
One might adhere to some form of general objective meaning whenever 
that seems possible.  A second approach would be to admit attention to 
“subjective understandings” or contextualized objective meaning only 
when appraisal of common meaning leaves doubt, when that meaning is 
not plain.  A third approach would be to restrict the kinds of evidence 
courts could examine about subjective understanding, in order to assure 
that evidence is reliable, and to preclude any “end run” around the rule 
that oral understandings cannot supplant the provisions of integrated 
written contracts.156  For example, courts might limit evidence to external 
manifestations other than oral conversations between the parties.157 Yet  
 154. Eisenberg remarks that “despite its formal de-emphasis of policy, the classical 
school’s philosophical, psychological, and jurisprudential assumptions seem to have 
reflected an extremely strong premium on certainty.”  Id. at 1110. 
 155. Writing that “[t]hrough the revised rules of the Uniform Commercial Code and 
the Second Restatement, the ‘contextualists’ have succeeded greatly in reducing the 
exclusionary potential of the interpretive process,”  Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, 
The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and 
Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 307 (1985), suggest that “[r]igorous 
application of the plain-meaning rule reduces interpretation error by encouraging more 
careful choices of clear, predefined signals.”  Id. at 311–12.  See also Posner, supra note 
140, at 568–73, on judicial application of the parol evidence rule in some circumstances 
in which the parties themselves might wish to avoid the use of external evidence of their 
understandings; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 134, at 570–85. 
 156. The third and second approaches could be combined; courts might restrict the 
occasions for evidence of intentions and the kinds of evidence they will entertain, or they 
might admit more evidence in some circumstances than in others. 
 157. Under this approach, a party who had not spoken previously could not make a 
claim well after signing about what he really understood at the time.  Such a rule could 
seriously reduce the possible significance of subjective elements in contract 
interpretation, because parties who suppose that their understandings are shared may 
have no occasion around the signing of a contract to explore potential differences. 
A comment to the Restatement (Second) may support this approach.  The comment is 
to the innocuous Section 200, which provides that “[i]nterpretation of a promise or 
agreement or a term thereof is the ascertainment of its meaning.”  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 (1981).  Comment b says, “the intention of a party that is 
relevant to formation of a contract is the intention manifested by him rather than any 
different undisclosed intention.”  Id. at § 200 cmt. b.  Most straightforwardly, the 
comment says that a party cannot claim an undisclosed intention that conflicts with an 
intention that he manifested.  If Ivo had said at the time that contract was signed, “I 
understand I will have to be there at training camp,” he could not later claim that he 
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another approach would be for courts to allow all sorts of external 
evidence of subjective understandings but impose a heavy burden of 
proof on anyone who claims that both parties shared a meaning that varies 
from a general one.  Unless that burden was met, a judge would follow the 
objective meaning. 
This last approach seemed the best for wills, and it might be best for 
contracts as well.  However, we can reach a judgment on that score only 
after we take a closer look at the plain meaning and parol evidence rules, 
as they might apply to contracts, at the possibility that the most sensible 
approach varies according to the sophistication of parties and the subject 
matter of a contract, and at the version of objective meaning that might 
control.  As I have said, if courts allow evidence of various dealings 
between the parties to establish a contextual “objective” meaning, the 
need to show subjective meaning will be much less frequent, because 
that meaning is much less likely to deviate from contextual “objective” 
meaning than from a general objective meaning. 
Consider a case in which in 1937 a father, after a divorce, had agreed 
to pay his ex-wife $1200 a year for his 10 year old son “until” the son’s 
“entrance . . . into . . . some college or . . . higher institution of learning 
beyond the completion of the high school grades,” and then to pay $2200 
per year after his son’s entrance to college for a period of that education 
but not for more than four years.158  Upon completing high school in 1946, 
the son was immediately drafted into the army. Determining that the 
point of the trust agreement was to educate the son and provide 
maintenance for him while he was in his mother’s custody, the court 
held that the father did not have to pay while his son was in the army.159
Only an exceptionally farsighted person in 1937 would have foreseen 
the son’s induction into the army; but some graduates of high school do 
work for a year or two and then enter college.  Because these young 
people usually work at low paying jobs, a divorcing couple might or 
might not conceive that the father’s obligation to contribute should 
continue during such a period.  The more one understood about the 
harbored a different, secret, intention about the terms to which he agreed.  But suppose 
he then said nothing about how he understood “during its season.”  Is he later barred 
from claiming that his understanding was the regular season?  I do not think the 
comment is meant to have this consequence.  It seems mainly about intentions to enter 
into contractual relations, cautioning that parties will be bound to manifested intentions 
that they may secretly not have embraced. 
 158. Spaulding v. Morse, 76 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Mass. 1947). 
 159. Id. at 139–40. 




father and mother—their expressed assumptions about children going to 
college immediately after high school, their backgrounds and levels 
of income, the father’s comments about whether parents should be 
generous to children or encourage their self reliance, the bitterness of the 
divorce—the more basis one would have to evaluate the significance of 
the contractual language for this circumstance.160  One might regard a 
highly contextualized objective approach as an inquiry about how a 
reasonable person intimately familiar with both the father and mother, 
and the history of their relations, would take the language in their 
agreement.161  There is no guarantee that the answer to that inquiry 
would fit what the parents actually had in mind, as revealed by their 
honest testimony at a trial or by their statements to each other when the 
agreement was reached;162 but the chance of a match would be much 
greater than if a court inquired only about the language of the contract 
and what people in general who were making such an agreement would 
mean. 
Whatever qualifications one might introduce for reasons of legal process 
or because the parties themselves may have wished to circumscribe the 
range of judicial inquiry, courts are faithful to the bargain parties 
actually struck if they give effect to their shared intended meaning over 
any opposed objective meaning. 
2.  Divergent Understandings 
Matters become more complex if the two parties do not share the same 
understanding.  When one party’s understanding squares with a reasonable 
meaning that is general, and the other’s does not, that understanding 
should ordinarily prevail.  People should be able to assume that others 
take words in their ordinary sense; they should not be vulnerable to 
surprise claims that the words meant something special.  This approach 
to situations when understandings diverge draws not only from systemic 
considerations but also fairness between the parties.  As Melvin Eisenberg 
 160. This highly contextualized approach might extend beyond dealings between 
the parties to aspects of the parties revealed by behavior toward others.  Especially 
insofar as such behavior was included, an objective appraisal might conclude that the 
two parties would assign different meanings to the terms. 
 161. If the inquiry concluded that these people would not have considered the 
option of work before college, a court would have to decide what treatment of the 
unforeseen circumstance of compulsory military service would best fit their objectives.  
If the inquiry concluded that the couple had considered ordinary work but not army 
service, a court would still have to decide how it should treat army service. 
 162. Farnsworth, supra note 146, at 949, notes that with many provisions of 
detailed contracts, there is no subjective intent.  A court then has to interpret them 
objectively or assign a meaning that fits broader purposes the parties subjectively had in 
mind. 
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points out,163 we can regard the approach as based on fault; the party 
with the less reasonable meaning is at fault for neither recognizing the 
other party’s understanding nor informing her of his own understanding. 
But this conclusion leaves open two important questions.  Which should 
be dispositive: the general ordinary understanding or the understanding 
likely to exist among parties to this sort of contract?  And might a court 
reasonably conclude that the party whose understanding fits a relevant 
general or particular one better should nevertheless lose because he bore 
more responsibility to have recognized the other’s likely understanding 
or to have assured that the parties arrived at a shared understanding? 
A variation on our soccer example, in which the team thinks “during 
its season” includes training camp but Ivo does not, illustrates both 
issues.  Suppose that in usage among people generally, “during its season” 
would usually be taken not to include training camp, but that within 
American sports contracts, including those of soccer leagues, the standard 
meaning of “during its season” includes training camp and exhibition 
games.  Courts typically allow proof of trade and local usages, and these 
control even when the meaning is distinctively at odds with the popular 
meaning of terms.164
On behalf of a contention that his contrary understanding should 
control nevertheless, Ivo might offer two related arguments, one about 
meaning based on the objective circumstances of his particular situation, 
another about the responsibility to clarify possible misunderstandings. 
Ivo was already under contract to play with a German team through 
the American team’s exhibition season.  Under an objective approach 
that looks only at the general meaning of terms and at common usage in 
a trade, this fact would be irrelevant.  But the Metro Stars certainly had 
reason to learn of Ivo’s existing contractual obligations, particularly 
because European players almost always accord priority to European 
competition.  The team should have supposed that he would not intend 
to break his German contract unless he explicitly, unambiguously said 
he would.  The phrase “during its season” is imprecise enough to create 
doubt that someone signing a contract with that phrase, taken alone, 
 163. Eisenberg, supra note 147, at 1131–32.  See also Randy E. Barnett, A Consent 
Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 303 (1986) (explaining why, according to a 
consent theory of contract, people should be able to rely on “objectively ascertainable 
assertive conduct”). 
 164. Thus, in the lumber industry, two packs of a certain size were regarded as 1000 
shingles.  A contract to deliver 4000 shingles could be fulfilled by delivery of 2500 
shingles in eight such packs.  Soutier v. Kellerman, 18 Mo. 509, 510–12 (1853). 




would intend to break a conflicting contractual obligation.  Thus, one 
might conclude that when a foreign soccer player under contract to play 
abroad during an American team’s training camp and exhibition games 
signs a contract to play “during its season,” the most reasonable meaning 
in that context is that “during its season” means only the regular 
season.165  We see, as we did with the contract to support a son through 
college, that even if the controlling interpretation is to be objectively 
based on external circumstances, much depends on how individualized is 
the context. 
Ivo’s related argument focuses on the responsibility for any 
misunderstanding.  The Metro Stars will contend that he should have 
been aware of the standard sense of the term “during its season” in 
soccer contracts, but he may respond that because he does not speak 
English well and because the team knew about his German contract, its 
representative should have told him precisely what “during its season” 
meant to the team.166  A judge might decide that the Metro Stars had 
much more reason to know of Ivo’s meaning than he had to know of the 
team’s meaning, even though the team’s meaning comported with that in 
the industry. 
The last century’s history of contract law and scholarship suggests 
various approaches to divergent understandings.  According to an 
objective approach that looks for the standard meaning of terms, the 
team would win.  Recall that Hand talked about “the usual meaning 
which the law imposes upon [the parties].”167  Such an approach leaves 
no room for argument that one party’s unusual understanding should 
control. 
 165. A party who is not part of a trade is not commonly held to trade usages that 
differ from common usage unless it is proved “either that he had actual knowledge of the 
usage or that the usage is ‘so generally known in the community that his actual 
individual knowledge of it may be inferred.’”  Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l 
Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (quoting 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 
A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE § 2464 (3d ed. 1940)). 
 166. The persuasiveness of this argument might depend partly on whether Ivo was 
advised by an American lawyer; if so, perhaps he should not be able to complain that he 
personally did not know the meaning of crucial terms.  This possibility raises the general 
problem of how to deal with claimed divergencies between what a party’s lawyers do, or 
should, understand and what a client understands.  We saw one aspect of this issue with 
wills.  One must worry about perverse incentives.  If clients can benefit by not 
understanding what their lawyers do, they have an incentive not to become fully 
informed.  But if clients are locked in to what their lawyers understand, they may have a 
(slight) incentive not to consult lawyers.  Unless a lawyer has made an outright mistake 
in formulating the terms of a contract, a party should probably be bound by the 
understanding of his or her lawyer, and that indeed is the prevailing law. 
 167. See supra text accompanying note 151. (I am assuming that “the usual 
meaning” would be contextualized enough to take into account standard usage in the 
industry.) 
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The first Restatement, following Williston, employed an objective 
approach to integrated contracts, but one that was somewhat more 
complex.  The standard of interpretation was “‘the meaning that would 
be attached . . . by a reasonably intelligent person’ familiar with all 
operative usages and knowing all the circumstances other than oral 
statements by the parties about what they intended the words to mean.”168  
This standard leaves us uncertain how to resolve Ivo’s case.  Much 
depends on just how individualized the relevant circumstances are taken 
to be.  Would the “reasonably intelligent person” know of Ivo’s contractual 
obligation with the German team and that virtually no European players 
would sacrifice the end of the European season for American training 
camp?  (The Restatement section clearly bars consideration of oral 
statements about what the terms mean, but should a court allow evidence 
that the team and Ivo did not discuss what “during its season” means?)  
If a judge did consider all the individual circumstances, he might well 
conclude that “during its season” meant only the regular season in this 
particular contract. 
The Restatement (Second) reflects Arthur Corbin’s partly subjective 
approach to divergent understandings.  Corbin suggested that a party 
should be able “to determine the operative meaning of the words of 
agreement by proving . . . that he so understood them and the other party 
knew that he did, or . . . had reason to know that he did.”169  In requiring 
someone like Ivo to show that he did understand “during its season” in 
the narrower sense (not only that he reasonably would have done so), 
and in allowing him then to succeed if the team was (subjectively) aware 
of his understanding (whether or not it should have been), this approach 
relies on two subjective elements that the Restatement (First) disregarded.  
The Restatement (Second) provides that if one party actually knows the 
meaning attached by the other, that meaning prevails if the other does 
not know of the meaning attached by the first party (even if he had 
reason to know).170  Thus, if the Metro Stars knew how Ivo understood 
“during its season” and he was unaware of the team’s contrary 
understanding, a court would adopt his understanding. 
According to the Restatement (Second), the meaning attached by one 
party also prevails if that party “had no reason to know of any different 
 168. Farnsworth, supra note 146, at 959 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 
230 (1932)). 
 169. ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 538 at 59–61 (1960). 
 170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(2)(a) (1981). 




meaning attached by the other, and the other had reason to know the 
meaning attached by the first party.”171  The spirit of this provision 
would support Ivo’s claim that the team should have realized he did not 
plan to join it in training camp.  But the section’s literal language creates 
an obstacle to reaching this conclusion.  Any party has some reason to 
learn the standard meaning of crucial terms, so Ivo had some reason to 
know the meaning the team might attach to the term indicating when he 
had to report for duty.  In contrasting “no reason to know” with “reason 
to know,” the Restatement does not explicitly address the situation in 
which each party has some reason to know the meaning attached by the 
other, but one of the two has a much stronger reason.172  Our soccer 
example suggests that, when each party has failed to learn the other’s 
meaning, A should prevail if B has substantially more reason to know 
A’s meaning than A has to know B’s meaning.  In assessing reason to 
know, a court should take account of unequal bargaining power, 
imposing on the dominant partner a greater responsibility to learn than 
on the weaker partner, especially if the dominant partner chooses terms 
which the weaker party has little or no opportunity to contest or change.  
In this way, a policy of fairness in contractual obligations would 
influence application of “reason to know.” 
The modern approach of Corbin, the Restatement (Second), and the 
U.C.C.173 seems fairer to the individual parties in instances of divergent 
understandings than any alternative.174  Until relatively recently, it 
appeared that this approach had largely won the day against the classical 
approach;175 but it turns out not only that many courts continue to adhere 
to general meaning, some noted scholars defend that approach, at least 
for contracts between business firms.176  They argue that attention to 
subjective understandings will lead to error and unduly burden both the 
courts and the parties themselves. 
 171. Id. at § 201(2)(b). 
 172. Id.  I have not discovered a discussion of this exact point, but one would 
assume that “no reason” would at least include a very slight reason. 
 173. See U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-202, 2-207, 2-302 (2003). 
 174. At least this is true so long as one assumes that the parties have not intended a 
more objective form of interpretation, see Posner supra note 140, at 568–73, and one 
also assumes that the court’s role is to give coherent content to the terms of the contract, 
not to strike some intermediate accommodation in such situations—splitting the 
difference as it were. 
 175. See, e.g. Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and 
Its Implications for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195, 206–07 (1998). 
 176. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 134, at 583. 
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B.  Plain Meaning and Parol Evidence Rules 
Restrictive rules may bar certain kinds of evidence in contracts cases 
and they may preclude all external evidence if the meaning of the 
contractual language is plain.  Modern courts typically allow evidence 
about trade and local usages.  However plain the ordinary language of a 
provision may appear, a party may show a contrary trade or local usage.  
What is at issue is whether a party can show more individualized 
contexts, including prior dealings between the parties, negotiations, and 
the course of performance, to overcome a meaning that appears clear if 
one looks only at the written text of the contract. 
According to the parol evidence rule, an integrated written contract 
supplants and terminates any prior agreements; thus courts will not 
consider evidence of undertakings that may supplement the terms of an 
integrated written contract if one would expect such undertakings to be 
in the written contract. 177  A clear conceptual division would treat the plain 
meaning rule as about interpreting the provisions of contracts, and the 
parol evidence rule as about establishing what count as the controlling 
terms of integrated contracts; and Arthur Corbin consistently maintained 
that the parol evidence rule had nothing to do with interpretation.178
Two complications render matters less sharp.  The first is that, as with 
regard to wills, courts have spoken, and continue to speak, with some 
frequency of the parol evidence rule as restricting evidence about the 
meaning of contractual terms.179  When a court allows certain evidence, 
but not other evidence, to contravene apparent meaning, it may be 
awkward to speak of a plain meaning rule, which typically excludes all 
evidence.  Many courts draw no clear distinction between a plain 
meaning rule and a parol evidence rule when it comes to interpretation. 
The second, more subtle, point is this: the distinction between evidence 
 177. One formulation is that a term is “not such as might naturally have been 
omitted;” another formulation is that a term “would certainly have been included.” 
 178. See ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 579 (3d ed. 1960). 
 179. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 140, 568–70.  It used to be thought that parol 
evidence could resolve latent ambiguities, ones not evident from the text itself but 
revealed by external facts, but should not resolve patent ambiguities, evident from the 
text itself.  Given the reality of the contextualization of linguistic usage, this is not a clear 
distinction in practice and it no longer plays a significant role in contracts discussions.  
Farnsworth, supra note 146, at 960–61.  Peter Linzer writes of the parol evidence and 
plain meaning rules as “conjoined like Siamese twins.” Linzer, supra note 135, at 801.  
The two rules could be conjoined in that the application of the plain meaning rule would 
trigger application of the parol evidence rule, but the conflation of the two rules is more 
thorough than that. 




about the meaning of language and evidence about supplementary terms 
can blur if parties are free to use language as they choose.  Thus, a party 
may claim that an omitted term was “implicit” in the contract’s language 
as a way to escape any bar on showing supplementary terms. 
Consider a case in which the court gave effect to the literal language 
of a contract that provided that if the couple that owned property 
obtained a bona fide purchaser, their neighbors could “exercise their 
right to purchase said premises at a value equivalent to the market value 
of the premises according to the [tax] assessment rolls . . . .”180  Nine 
years later, the surviving widow, who wanted to sell, received offers of 
$35,000 and $30,000.181  Her good neighbors then tendered her $7820, 
twice the assessed value on the tax rolls.182  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court said the meaning of the terms was plain, and therefore that intent 
was to be discovered only from the contract’s express language;183 the 
trial judge erred in admitting testimony that the formula was meant to 
serve as “a mutual protective minimum price.”184
So long as Mrs. Steuart claimed that in addition to the terms of the 
contract, she and her neighbors had agreed that they would pay a fair 
price in terms of actual market value, a court that had initially 
determined that the contract was integrated would bar her testimony 
according to the parol evidence rule.185  If she claimed, instead, that the 
term “the market value of the premises according to the [tax] assessment 
rolls” embodied an implicit assumption that the value on the assessment 
rolls would approximate half of market value (and that the county’s 
failure to keep its rolls up to date meant that a condition for operation of 
the contract was not fulfilled), the claim would be one about how to 
interpret the contractual language, not about supplementing it.186  In that 
event, a parol evidence rule limited to evidence about supplementary 
terms would not prevent her testimony; only a plain meaning rule, if 
applicable, (or a parol evidence rule that covers interpretation) would 
 180. Steuart v. McChesney, 444 A.2d 659, 660 (Pa. 1982). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 661.  The practice was to set assessment value at half market value, so 
this was the amount apparently contemplated by the contract’s literal terms.  Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. However, many courts would admit this testimony as bearing on whether the 
written contract was integrated.  The obvious possibility of an unfair price under the 
literal terms of the contract might be taken to suggest that the contract did not embody 
the full understanding of the parties. 
 186. Alternatively, the owner might have asserted that courts should adopt an 
“interpretive presumption that express terms supplement rather than trump the 
contractual context . . . .”  Goetz & Scott, supra note 155, at 313.  On this view, the 
contract includes standard assumptions one would make about fair and reasonable terms, 
unless they are explicitly disavowed. 
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stand in her way.  If Steuart claimed the overall purpose of the contract 
was to assure a fair price between friendly neighbors, with no one seeking 
an economic advantage but rather with her and her husband trying to 
accommodate the desires of the McChesneys to buy an adjoining 
property, it might be hard to say whether the claim would concern 
supplementation or interpretation that focuses on purpose.  Yet the same 
actual conversations among the owners and their neighbors could give 
rise to any of these three claims.  Here the difference between adding 
terms and interpreting terms would have more to do with legal ingenuity 
than substance.  Thus, one might defend a parol evidence rule that 
covers interpretation as necessary to protect the force of the rule against 
claims of supplementary agreements.187
We can see how such a view might work in relation to reliance on 
preliminary documents leading up to an integrated contract.  Such 
documents cannot establish independent terms of agreement that one 
would expect in the final contract, but the documents can assist 
understanding of the terms of the final contract, showing what the parties 
were aiming to do or resolutions they rejected.188  A ban on prior 
proposals to help interpret contracts might be justified as preventing 
deviations from the terms on which the parties finally agreed.189
In the remainder of this section, we will focus on a rule that bars 
external evidence about meaning.  If “the rule” is one that declares that 
“the plain meaning,” if one can be found, is the legally relevant meaning, 
whatever the parties intended and whatever a more contextualized 
inquiry might reveal, then the rule is one of substantive law, not evidence. A 
 187.   The very same words offered as an additional term that are rejected  
because the court deems the writing to be a total integration, can be offered as 
an aid to interpretation of an ambiguous written term.  Able courts look at both 
proffers of evidence as governed by the “parol evidence rule.” 
JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3.9, at 148 (4th ed. 
1998). 
 188. It is not always easy to establish whether a proposed resolution was rejected or 
carried forward, but the same is true about prior legislative proposals; and that fact has 
never been thought to make prior drafts useless as legislative history. 
 189. Although worries about this problem may be lessened to some degree because 
interpretation is generally up to the judge, not the jury, factual disputes that bear an 
interpretation may be resolved by jurors.  See Farnsworth, supra note 146, at 962.  William C. 
Whitford, The Role of the Jury (and the Fact/Law Distinction) in the Interpretation of Written 
Contracts, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 931, 931–32, shows not only that jurors often resolve contests 
over contractual interpretation but that, according to a standard understanding of the line 
between legal and factual issues, they should.  One reason to bar external evidence is distrust 
that jurors will fairly decide factual issues that such evidence raises. 




genuine rule of evidence bars evidence that could help establish a 
proposition that is legally relevant.190
To speak of a “rule” as if all evidence is allowed or all evidence is 
barred is a considerable oversimplification.  As Professors Schwartz and Scott 
explain, one may speak of a minimum evidentiary base “composed of 
the parties’ contract, a narrative concerning whether the parties performed 
the obligations that the contract appears to require, a standard English 
language dictionary, and the interpreter’s experience and understanding 
of the world.”  To this evidentiary base, courts have added “(1) the parties’ 
practice under prior agreements; (2) the parties’ practice under the current 
agreement; (3) testimony as to what was said during the negotiations; (4) 
written pre-contractual documents (memoranda, prior drafts, letters); and 
(5) [relevant] industry custom . . . .”191  As courts admit more of these 
forms of evidence, they move toward a maximum evidentiary base that 
allows them to decide what, “all-things-considered,”192 the parties 
intended—the evidentiary base favored by “contextualists.”193
A plain meaning or “hard” parol evidence rule bars evidence, not only 
of the parties’ subjective understandings, but also of what a reasonable 
outsider would understand in light of the entire course of dealing of the 
parties.  Indeed, in most cases discussing the plain meaning rule, the 
attempt is to introduce just such evidence of what the agreement meant 
“objectively” in context.194
A case in which a court distinguished evidence of subjective 
understanding from evidence of contextualized objective meaning is 
Home Insurance Co. v. Chicago and Northwestern Transportation Co.195  
 190. For example, if Ivo’s belief about what “during its season” meant was legally 
relevant, and a court refused to consider what he told reporters, the preclusion would rest on a 
rule of evidence.  This conceptual distinction between rules of law and rules of evidence has 
limited practical import.  If most evidence that might show that subjective understandings 
differ from objective ones is barred, the consequence will be a law of contracts that gives 
these subjective understandings little significance.  See Perillo, supra note 144, at 435, on the 
relation between the exclusion of party testimony and an ostensible subjective approach to 
meaning. 
 191. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 134, at 572.  This may be a quibble, but I think it 
is a bit misleading to treat an interpreter’s experience and understanding as an aspect of 
an evidentiary base.  No doubt, it is part of her informational base, but she does not 
typically consider it as evidence (though she might treat some isolated personal event 
like evidence.) 
 192. See Katz, supra note 139, at 498. 
 193. See id. at 497–98.  One way of characterizing this movement from a restricted 
minimum base toward a fuller one is as a shift from a formal to a substantive approach. 
 194. Ross and Tranen write that, for contracts as well as statutes, “the real 
controversy is not whether to apply an objective or a subjective approach to meaning, but 
whether to consider evidence . . . that demonstrates, in an objective way, how the parties 
manifested their subjective intentions.”  Ross & Tranen, supra note 175, at 216–17. 
 195. 56 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 1995). See also Goetz & Scott, supra note 155, at 307 
(“In numerous cases, courts are unwilling to accept the full implications of 
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had to decide if a provision in the 
contract limiting damages covered an accident between freight cars and 
commuter cars for which CNW was negligent.  The court said it would 
admit “objective” evidence of ambiguity that a person familiar with “the 
context of the contract would know that the contract means something 
other than what it seems to mean” but would not admit “subjective” 
evidence of ambiguity about what the parties believed the contract 
means, “which is invariably self-serving, inherently difficult to verify 
and thus, inadmissible.”196 
Whether a rule should bar any evidence of how the parties did 
understand, or how a detached observer would understand, the terms of 
the contract is controversial.197  The traditional or conservative approach 
allows evidence of actual subjective understandings or contextualized 
objective meaning only if the terms of the contract are vague or 
ambiguous.  The Uniform Commercial Code, the Second Restatement, and 
many state courts have abandoned this restraint; they permit evidence of 
context that would lead a reasonable outsider viewing the contract to 
assign a meaning that was different from the standard meaning.198  
Under this liberal approach, Ivo could introduce his contract with the 
German team to show that he and the Metro Stars reasonably supposed 
that his contract with it covered only the regular season.  
contextualization; in one guise or another, they still invoke the primacy of express, 
written texts to exclude extrinsic evidence.”). 
 196. Home Insurance Co., 56 F.3d at 768.  See also Judge Posner’s earlier opinion 
in AM Int’l, Inc. v. Graphic Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 44 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 1995).  On this 
division, public comments to reporters at the time of signing might be classed as 
“subjective,” but they would not involve the problems that evidence about subjective 
understandings would typically involve. 
 197. See generally Farnsworth, supra note 146, at 952–65.  See also Pac. Gas and 
Elect. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968), a famous 
opinion by Roger Traynor indicating that the key issue, citing Corbin, was how the 
writers understood their words.  Id. at 643.  But as Peter Linzer has noted, Traynor 
required that extrinsic evidence “prove a meaning to which the language of the 
instrument is reasonably susceptible.”  Id. at 644, discussed in Linzer, supra note 135, at 
822–23. 
 198. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 201–03 (1981).  These sections 
also make relevant actual subjective understandings.  An intermediate approach is to 
require vagueness or ambiguity before external evidence may be introduced as to 
meaning but to be very generous about the minimum necessary to surmount the 
threshold of vagueness and ambiguity.  According to William Whitford, the main 
contention is among objective approaches, but “[a] few commentators still advocate 
inquiry into the existence of a subjective meeting of minds as the first step in any 
interpretive process.”  Whitford, supra note189, at 935. 




In the discussion of wills, we have reviewed and rejected arguments 
that a plain meaning rule is actually incoherent.  The force of the claim 
that, because all language is vague or ambiguous to some degree, 
meaning can never be plain, depends considerably on how “plain meaning” 
is to be understood, and particularly on how far an investigation of 
meaning considers individual circumstances.  A claim that meaning is 
plain absent any reference to context may indeed be incoherent about 
most communications, but meaning in context is often clear.  Suppose 
that for decades, “during its season” has, in contracts between athletes 
and American teams, included the entire season beginning with training 
camp.  If one asks about the meaning of the phrase for sports contracts in 
general, the meaning is plain.199
When one further particularizes context, meaning may become less 
plain.  As Avery Katz writes, “what meaning is plain will be agent-specific 
and context-specific.”200  If one asks about the meaning of “during its 
season” in a contract with a foreign athlete who is already under contract 
to play elsewhere during the period of the training camp and exhibition 
games, the meaning becomes less obvious than if one asks about sports 
contracts in general.  As the inquiry becomes further contextualized, the 
chances may increase that a meaning that seems plain, in general, will 
seem plain no longer, although sometimes the reverse will happen—the 
greater context will make meaning more plain. 
As we have seen, as the inquiry about meaning becomes more 
contextualized, the chances that actual subjective understanding will 
vary from apparent meaning diminish significantly.  Once a judge 
initially determines that in the specific context a term most probably 
meant one thing, a party trying to show that she meant something 
different, and that either the other party agreed with her or that she 
should prevail over the party whose understanding fits what the court 
would expect, will carry a very heavy burden. 
Putting aside convenience of administration, which some parties may 
desire, and the possibility that a restrictive rule will encourage better 
drafting of contracts and more faithful adherence to their terms, courts 
 199. That is the meaning according to what Schwartz & Scott, supra note 134, at 
570–72, call “majority talk.”  They have in mind ordinary understandings in the 
population generally, but I do not think it stretches their purpose too much to include 
understandings that are near universal for some narrower settings, such as sports 
contracts.  Of course, meaning can evolve over time, but right now the phrase “during its 
season” has a standard, widely understood, significance. 
 200. According to Katz, supra note 139, at 521, “for a given audience or interpreter, 
plain meaning corresponds to the interpretation associated with the interpreter’s ordinary 
or zero-cost context—that is, the context that the interpreter can apply with minimal 
work.”  This definition either rejects or neglects what I believe is a crucial feature of the 
traditional meaning of the term—that a plain meaning must be “plain” or fairly obvious. 
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have no solid reason to refuse evidence that explains the full context of a 
contract.  Should they bar evidence of subjective understandings that 
differ from what a contextual objective approach indicates about the 
meaning of terms?  At the very least, courts should set a high burden of 
proof that a contract means something other than what it apparently 
means in context.  Two reasons to bar such evidence altogether are 
the opportunity it presents for lying 201 and the slim chance that it will 
make a difference.  In favor of admitting the evidence is the difficulty 
of winnowing out evidence of subjective understandings from evidence 
of contextual objective meaning, and the judgment that if two parties 
have really shared a bizarre understanding, it should be recognized.202
Exactly how much evidence to admit of contextual objective meaning 
and of subjective understandings may well depend of the kind of 
contract involved.203
C.  Public Policy and Interpretation: Fairness to the Parties                     
and Other-Regarding Interests 
Public policy considerations involving fairness between the parties or 
more general public interests can play a part in contractual interpretation. 
1.  Unenforceability and Unconscionability 
Most straightforwardly, public policy can bar the enforcement of 
contracts.  Courts refuse to enforce agreements to commit criminal acts 
or to engage in other undesirable behavior, and a major doctrine of 
unenforceability involves contracts that are “unconscionable,” or seriously 
 201. The worry about lying is increased when jurors resolve relevant factual 
matters.  See Whitford, supra note 189, at 943–44.  Jurors may reward a sympathetic 
party by crediting an implausible story.  Similar risks also attend some claims about 
contextual objective meaning. 
 202. See Posner, supra note 140, at 553–55, who reviews various factors that would 
bear on rational decisions about how strictly to apply the parol evidence rule; see also 
Schwartz & Scott’s treatment of contracts involving business firms, Schwartz & Scott, 
supra note 134. 
 203. One article suggests that the complexity of a contract’s provisions matters for 
interpretation but that no straightforward correlation exists between a contract’s degree 
of simplicity and the liberality with which it should be interpreted.  See Karen Eggleston, 
Eric A. Posner, & Richard Zechhauser, The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why 
Complexity Matters, 95 NW. L. REV. 91 (2000).  Because the reasons for simplicity (and 
complexity) differ significantly, so also does the appropriate interpretive response; the 
reactions of judges should depend on the causes of simplicity (and complexity) they can 
identify. 




unfair in how one party treats the other.204  Although the common 
consequence of a determination of unconscionability is nonenforcement 
of the entire contract or of the unconscionable term, a court may 
explicitly rewrite the terms of a contract to make them fair.  U.C.C § 2-302 
provides that a court may “limit application of any unconscionable 
clause to avoid any unconscionable results.”205
As far as interpretation is concerned, the more significant situations do 
not involve judges refusing to enforce terms or explicitly rewriting them, 
but their concluding based on public policy and fairness that contractual 
terms do not mean what they seem to say.  According to Section 203 of 
Restatement (Second): “an interpretation which gives a reasonable, 
lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation 
which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect.”206  Another 
section covering contracts that affect the public interests provides that 
“[i]n choosing among . . . reasonable meanings . . . , a meaning that serves 
the public interest is generally preferred.”207  Comment c to Section 203 
indicates that courts should not stretch too far to interpret contracts to 
make them lawful or reasonable.208  They should choose such a meaning 
over an unlawful or unreasonable meaning when both are plausible but 
they should not, in the guise of interpretation, adopt an implausible 
permitted meaning over a plausible meaning that is not acceptable. 
This approach bears interesting comparison with the effort of courts to 
interpret statutes so that they are constitutional.  Just how far courts 
should strain ordinary meaning in that setting is controversial, but some 
important decisions give statutes otherwise implausible renderings in 
order to save them from invalidity, or even from constitutional doubt.  
Courts may be hesitant to say that legislatures have acted invalidly, and 
declarations that general statutes are unconstitutional are of substantial 
 204. Contractual terms may be unconscionable because one party lacked a 
reasonable chance to perceive and understand terms that seem unfair, or because the 
terms are unfair even if fully understood.  See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.1965). 
 205. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2001).  The New Jersey Supreme Court was even more 
creative in Vasquez v. Glassboro Serv. Ass’n, Inc., 415 A.2d 1156 (N.J. 1980).  Vasquez, 
a migrant worker from Puerto Rico living in quarters provided by a farm labor service 
organization, was discharged and was not permitted to remain overnight.  Id. at 1158.  
Emphasizing the extreme inequality in his contract to work there, the court relied on 
public policy to rewrite a term of the contract, implying a provision to assure workers a 
reasonable time to find other housing.  Id. at 1158–66. 
 206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203 (1981). The main idea of 
“reasonable” in the section concerns relations between the parties, but an agreement 
contrary to another public policy may also be unreasonable. 
 207. Id. at § 207.  The rule this section expresses has, the comment tells us, been 
used to interpret grants of public franchises. 
 208. “If a term or contract is unconscionable or otherwise against public policy, it 
should be dealt with directly rather than by spurious interpretation.”  Id. at § 203 cmt. c. 
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moment.  Saying that a private contract is unlawful carries much less 
practical import and involves no insult to a coordinate branch of 
government.  Further, courts may explicitly substitute lawful for unlawful 
terms in a contract; they are more limited in the extent to which they can 
rework statutes. 
How often a court interpreting contractual provisions should rely on 
public policies that parties are free to violate, if they do so explicitly, is 
more troublesome.  A broad doctrine of interpreting contracts to be 
reasonable and in the public interest cannot be seen as simply a device to 
help carry out the likely intentions of the parties, because parties 
together may believe that their mutual advantage will be served by an 
agreement that fails to conform with the broad public interest.  In 
preferring a reasonable meaning to an unreasonable one, Section 203 of 
the Restatement signals that considerations of fairness should matter 
when competing interpretations are plausible, even beyond what fairness 
might indicate about the parties’ intentions.209
One aspect of this encouragement to judges to achieve fair results is 
acknowledgment of a connection between degrees of assent and modes 
of interpretation.  For many contracts, thinking of assent to terms as 
being equal is unrealistic.  One party understands terms it has chosen; 
the other party signs on with little choice or understanding of many 
specific terms and with little awareness whether a better deal is “out 
there” somewhere.  Generalizing from some examples, William Woodward 
has written, “the smaller the contract and the more obscure or complex 
the term, the greater the chance that the nondrafter’s true understanding 
of the deal—an understanding adequate to evaluate and ‘price’ the 
exchange—will deviate from what is in the writing.”210  By leaning 
toward an interpretation of terms that is fair, a court redresses an 
imbalance in assent to a degree.  This reality suggests the more pervasive 
question how far courts interpreting authoritative language should take 
into account the conditions of its adoption, construing language in a 
manner that will compensate for imperfections in that process. 
The rule that contracts that affect the public interests should generally 
be interpreted to serve the public interest has mainly been applied in cases 
dealing with public franchises and tax exemptions, discouraging courts from 
granting sweeping concessions to private interests that legislatures have not 
 209. See id. at § 203.  However, a comment to Section 203 does say that “[t]he 
search is for the manifested intention of the parties.”  Id. at cmt. c. 
 210. Woodward, supra note 139, at 990. 




clearly provided.  However, Corbin indicates that the rule is not restricted to 
such contracts,211 and a recent article enumerates some other situations, 
including standard form contracts, in which the rule has been invoked.212
Some scholars have rejected public policy as an independent guide to 
interpretation over the range in which parties could freely contract.213  
Arguing that contract law should help parties carry out their aims, they 
urge that interpretation should follow what parties have probably (or 
would have) agreed to.  In part, the idea is that sophisticated parties will 
simply need to expend more effort in writing terms if courts will use 
public policy to interpret vague terms to their disadvantage.  In part, the 
idea is that public policy is better served by independent branches of 
law, such as the law of marriage and divorce, environmental law, and 
labor relations law, than by judges trying to achieve public policies 
through interpreting contracts.214  Perhaps it can be shown that for many 
kinds of contracts, interpreting them in accord with public policy is 
unproductive or unnecessary or both, but we should not assume that 
because of some principle of autonomy,215 contract interpretation in 
general should be free from the influence of public-regarding 
considerations when judges must choose between competing plausible 
readings of contractual terms.  True it may be that parties can disregard 
some public policies, but so also can the writers of wills and statutes. 
D.  Filling in Terms 
Although modern American courts interpreting written contracts do 
not typically disregard specific terms that seem in tension with the 
overall purposes of the contracting parties,216 they will often provide 
content for indefinite terms and supply terms that the parties have 
omitted.217  A common example is a contract that omits the time for 
 211. ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 550 (3d ed. 1960). 
 212. Zamir, supra note 135, at 1723–24.  A concern that a public agency may be 
“captured” by private interests that receive franchises and exemptions is not present 
when purely private parties contract. 
 213. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 134, at 554, suggesting that in contracts 
between business firms, courts should facilitate efforts of the parties to maximize their 
joint gains. 
 214. Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 
472 (1980), demonstrates that contract law cannot disregard issues of distributive justice, 
but he does not concentrate on interpretation of contracts between parties who could 
disregard such considerations. 
 215. See generally Barnett, supra note 163, at 276–77. 
 216. See, e.g., Steuart v. Mc Chesney, 444 A.2d 659 (Pa. 1982), discussed supra 
text accompanying notes 180–87.  Because a provision is likely to favor one party at the 
expense of another, courts are hesitant to say a provision consciously adopted by both 
parties is to be disregarded in light of an overall purpose. 
 217. According to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1981): “When the 
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performance; a court will require performance in a reasonable time.  
This power does not involve the court in changing a contract’s explicit 
terms but in fashioning new ones.  Yet, we do not find the same explicit 
power in the law of wills or in statutory and constitutional interpretation.  
Charles Goetz and Robert Scott describe a major shift from a traditional 
“presumption that the parties’ writings and the official law of contract 
are the definitive elements of the agreement” to a law in which 
“[e]vidence derived from experience and practice can now trigger the 
incorporation of additional, implied terms.”218
Professor Scott, however, has recently claimed that the trend toward 
filling in incomplete terms has not gone as far as most scholars have 
supposed.219  In a significant percentage of cases, courts will not enforce 
agreements that the parties have deliberately left incomplete, refusing to 
fill in terms that do not depend on events outside the contract, and that 
could have been made specific, and whose performance could have been 
verified by the party to whom the obligations would have been owed.220  
Scott suggests that if judges fill in such terms when parties bring such 
agreements to court, doing so could be socially inefficient.221
parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a 
term which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is 
reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court.”  As a Note in the 2003 
Columbia Law Review indicates, all courts in the United States are generous in filling in 
the terms of sales contracts, covered by the Uniform Commercial Code.  Some remain 
restrictive in dealing with service contracts.  The Note argues for a flexible approach to 
all kinds of contracts.  Nellie Eunsoo Choi, Contracts with Open or Missing Terms 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Common Law: A Proposal for 
Unification, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (2003).  Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing 
Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1657–61 (2003), defends the 
traditional practice of nonenforcement for some indefinite agreements. 
 218. Goetz & Scott, supra note 155, at 274.  For an account of the general 
jurisprudential assumption of Karl Llewellyn, the major draftsman of the U.C.C., that 
law lies in patterns of practice rather than in explicit rules, see Richard Danzig, A 
Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 
621–24 (1975). 
 219. See Scott, supra note 217, at 1642–44. 
 220. Id. at 1642–44, 1657–61.  Employing experimental analysis of behavior 
motivated by a sense of reciprocal fairness, as well as economic analysis of potential 
gains and losses to parties that deliberately leave unspecified terms such as the standards 
for a bonus, Scott claims that we can understand why parties rationally choose this 
course, depending on self enforcement.  Id. at 1661–85.  For a skeptical view about the 
possible merits of a formalist approach for actual contractual relations, see Woodward, 
supra note 139.  Woodward is particularly critical of proposed reforms of the U.C.C. that 
would require courts to stick more closely to the explicit terms of forms.  Id. at 991–93. 
 221. Scott, supra note 217, at 1685–92. 




When courts do imply new terms for contracts, we can understand 
them as relying on four, not always separable, bases.  One is the language of 
the express contract; thus, when an owner contracted to “transport” 
goods on his barge, the Supreme Court found an implied promise to 
supply the tug to tow the barge.222  A second basis is the conduct of the 
parties.  A third is standard usage in the trade.  Finally, courts may imply 
terms that fit with legal policies. 
Exactly how does this power to “fill in” terms relate to interpretation, 
and why do courts have this power for contracts?  One technique that is 
used both for interpretation of ambiguities and for filling in omissions is 
to ask about a hypothetical bargain: what would the parties have agreed 
to had the parties specifically addressed this issue?223  Courts often speak 
of an implied term, drawn from the provisions to which the parties have 
agreed.  “Where there is tacit agreement or a common tacit assumption 
or where a term can be supplied by logical deduction from agreed terms 
and the circumstances, interpretation may be enough.”224  In some 
instances, one may be hard put to say whether what is needed is a direct 
interpretation of existing terms or filling in of new ones.  Recall the case 
in which the father had promised to pay $1200 per year for his son’s 
upkeep “until” the son’s entrance into college, and then $2200 for his 
college years.225  The issue whether the father owed money for time his 
son spent in the army after being drafted could be understood as an 
interpretation of the significance of “until” in the context of the 
 222. Sacramento Nav. Co. v. Salz, 273 U.S. 326, 329 (1927) (discussed in ARTHUR 
LINTON CORBIN, 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 561 (3d ed. 1960)). 
 223. David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract 
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1816 (1991).  Charny points out just how 
complicated are the questions why a hypothetical bargain may matter and how one 
should understand the bargain.  In determining how individual or general and how 
ordinary or idealized one believes judges should make hypothetical bargainers, one may 
well be influenced by the theory of justification for enforcing contracts that he accepts.  
Id. at 1820–79. 
 224. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. c (1981).  According to 
Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 489, 505 (1989), “While it is perhaps more common to speak of 
‘interpretation’ in cases where parties attempt to resolve an issue but do so with 
insufficient clarity, and to speak of applying default rules in cases where the parties 
made no attempt to address an issue, the principle is much the same in either case.”  A 
helpful note on psychological premises underlying the idea of “tacit assumptions” in the 
context of changed circumstances is in LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, 
BASIC CONTRACT LAW 720–23 (6th ed. 1996).  Robert Scott’s treatment of non-
enforcement of incomplete agreements suggests that examination of the entire agreement 
may indicate that the parties intended non-enforcement, or at least did not 
unambiguously intend enforcement.  See Scott, supra note 217, at 1692–93.  This is an 
example in which interpretation of the entire scope of an agreement can be involved in 
deciding whether or not a legally binding contract exists. 
 225. See Spaulding v. Morse, 76 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Mass. 1947), and supra text 
accompanying notes 158–60. 
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operative sentence in the contract. But one might look at the contract and 
respond, “The divorcing couple did not address the possibility of army 
service (or other work) between high school and college, so the question 
is how to fill in for this unforeseen contingency.”  Even when a term is 
undoubtedly omitted, the court’s exercise may not be so different from 
when it interprets an ambiguous term. 
The Restatement (Second) and its comments suggest a different approach.  
According to a comment, “where there is in fact no agreement, the court 
should supply a term which comports with community standards of 
fairness and policy rather than analyze a hypothetical model of the 
bargaining process.”226  One defense of this proposal could be that courts 
cannot easily discern what parties would have done about matters they 
did not address; but administrative convenience also counts.  If courts 
employ standards of fairness and policy to fill in omitted terms, perhaps 
they can treat similar contracts similarly, not worrying about what 
individual parties would have agreed to.  This approach may have the 
further advantage that parties making contracts can rely on courts to 
supply “default” terms when negotiation of terms would be time consuming 
and contentious, and unlikely to be relevant over the life of a contract, 
and the parties can inform themselves about what terms a court will 
supply, should unexpected circumstances require one.227
For courts that regard their job of “filling in” as drawing out the 
implications of the entire contract and deciding what term the parties 
themselves would have supplied, any distinction between discerning meaning 
and constructing meaning is blurred.  But courts that rely mainly on 
standards of fairness and policy, apart from how those relate to the 
parties’ likely intentions, have departed from trying to carry out just 
 226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d (1981).  But see Scott, 
supra note 217, at 1645, on why courts should not always supply “fair” terms if the 
parties have chosen to leave terms indefinite.  Corbin says that when terms are implied 
because of legal policy, that does not involve “true interpretation.”  ARTHUR LINTON 
CORBIN, 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 561 (3d ed. 1960). 
 227. Reliance on highly specific contexts can undermine, to a degree, the value of 
having standard legal provisions, which parties can assume unless they direct otherwise.  
Goetz & Scott, supra note 155, at 273–80.  Although the standard assumption has been 
that default terms should largely be guided by what most parties would want, Ian Ayres 
has suggested that using terms the parties would probably not want could be a helpful 
technique to force them to deal with issues explicitly.  Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts 
on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 6 (1993).  See 
also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 89, 91–95 (1989). 




what the contractual language suggests that the parties wanted. 
This subject is further complicated by the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing that contractual parties must assume.228  Whether or not this duty 
is an independent source of contractual obligations, it can guide the way 
an agreement’s terms are understood.229  Judges who rely on that duty to 
fill in omitted terms may be seen as interpreting the entire contract. 
Why are courts more willing to “fill in” terms in contracts than terms 
in wills or provisions for statutes?  As we have noted, contracts are less 
formal documents than either wills or statutes.  Parties making contracts rely 
on the willingness of each other to perform, and it may be desirable to 
have long term contracts, relational contracts, that are both enforceable 
and leave some matters open as conditions change.230  Further, because 
contracts are subject to negotiation, arriving at terms can be much more 
difficult for contracts than for wills.  And, if a contract fails, the law 
typically does not have an alternative scheme of enforcement; if a will 
fails in some respect, the property goes to a residuary legatee or passes 
according to legal rules for intestate succession, thus reducing any need 
to “fill in.” 
Arriving at terms is even more difficult for statutes than contracts, but 
it is the business of legislators to adopt legislation.  Legislators often 
assign wide discretion to administrative agencies.  Courts will give content 
to vague phrases in statutes, as they will with contracts, and they must 
sometimes harmonize provisions that do not fit well together; but they 
do not commonly supply crucial terms legislators have consciously omitted. 
In recent years, the role of the courts in respect to omitted terms 
and default rules231—rules that parties can bargain around if they 
choose232—has been the subject of scholarly controversy.  To oversimplify, 
some writers have strongly challenged the idea that courts should be 
active in creating default rules for construing contracts.  Whether they 
 228. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); U.C.C. § 1-304 
(2004).  This is a duty that parties cannot bargain around. 
 229. HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS 8–19 (rev. ed. 1993). 
 230. See Ian MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations 
under Classical, Neo-Classical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854 
(1978); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. 
L. REV. 1089 (1981).  Elizabeth S. Scott and Robert E. Scott have suggested that 
marriage should be viewed as a relational contract.  Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, 
Marriage as a Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1998).  For a skeptical view of 
competence of courts to define and enforce the terms of such contracts, see Eric A. 
Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. 
U. L. REV. 749, 754 (2000). 
 231. Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual 
Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 823–24 (1992) (remarking on “an almost imperceptible 
shift” in rhetoric from “gap filling” to “default rules”). 
 232. Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 390 (1993). 
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are designed to promote efficient consequences that the parties would 
approve or to achieve justice between the parties or for the broader 
society,233 such default rules are said to be largely misguided.234
The efficiency challenge is complex, but its basic outline is 
straightforward enough.  Default rules must be cast at a broad level of 
generality; contracts differ greatly.  To promote efficient solutions, default 
rules must attain a wide acceptability; otherwise parties will simply 
circumvent them and they will have little effect.  These default rules 
must also correspond with information that is available to parties and to 
courts.  (A rule that keys damages to the difference between the contract 
price and market price satisfies this information constraint because the 
relevant facts can be known by the parties and a court.)235  Given the 
variability in contractual relations, few default rules can meet the 
acceptability and information constraints.236
The challenge to default rules that are designed to reach just outcomes 
in particular cases or to promote socially desirable behavior, or both, 
may or may not rest on a principled philosophy about justifications for 
the law of contracts.  For those who see contract law, and perhaps all of 
common law, as resting exclusively on considerations of efficiency, 
courts should have no occasion to deviate from efficient outcomes, 
unless the parties agree to that.  Similarly, those who identify consent or 
autonomy as the key to contractual rights237 might perceive courts as 
unjustified when they swerve from trying their best to carry out the 
bargain of the parties.238  For those, like myself, who see contract law as 
one part of a law that should serve multiple values, the idea of having 
some default rules that reflect social considerations beyond the wishes of 
the parties, and beyond the most efficient solutions to their individual 
 233. See id. at 390–91 (distinguishing problem-solving, equilibrium-inducing, 
information-forcing, normative, transformative, and structural default rules). 
 234. See id. at 390–92; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 134, at 547. 
 235. Schwartz, supra note 232, at 392. 
 236. See generally Ian Ayres, supra note 227 (discussing the comparative merits of 
rules and standards as default rules). 
 237. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 163, at 269–71. 
 238. Richard Craswell, supra note 224, suggests that promissory and autonomy 
theories are little help in determining how to fill in substantive terms; but those theories 
seem to point toward respect for the parties’ aims.  Cf. Randy Barnett’s response, 
Barnett, supra note 231, at 875–94 (responding to Craswell’s suggestion).  See also Jody 
S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 
AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 687–90 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) 
(discussing how theorists may think terms should be filled in). 




relationships, is not objectionable in principle.  It is not an answer to this 
perspective that the parties could have explicitly provided for the 
outcome the court deems less just.  If parties to a contract are relying on 
legal enforcement and one party, at least, has sought that enforcement, 
with its attendant costs for the whole society, judges may reasonably say 
that as to matters the parties have left open, the court will strike a 
resolution that conforms with what is just between the parties or best for 
society at large. 
Regrettably, perhaps, the dispute cannot be settled by the theoretical 
premise that contract law serves multiple values.  An opponent of 
justice-serving default rules of interpretation and gap filling may say that 
the general law of contracts—applied to parties by courts only in the 
infrequent cases that are litigated—is a very poor vehicle for trying to 
achieve social justice.239  That aspiration is better attained by discrete 
areas of law such as family law and labor relations law.  Further, default 
rules that fit social justice at the expense of the parties will be largely 
pointless because parties will bargain around them.240  The power of this 
critique may depend on the sophistication of contractual parties; it is 
strongest in respect to experienced parties familiar enough with the law 
of contracts to avoid default rules that may be to their disadvantage. 
E.  Express Terms and Other Factors: Reassessments 
The picture this account has presented, of express terms largely controlling 
the application of contracts, except when terms are unclear or vague or 
are omitted, reflects a standard approach to the interpretation of contracts.  
However, its accuracy and normative appropriateness can be challenged 
from both sides. 
A convenient vehicle to examine the possibility that the texts of 
contracts are less important than the standard approach supposes is an 
article by Eyal Zamir, whose central thesis is that the traditional ordering 
of criteria to interpret contracts is actually inverted, and desirably so.241  
One need not accept his thesis in full to wonder if text is less central than 
one might assume from examining doctrines one by one, a suspicion that 
may be reinforced when one observes how often the courts appear to 
manipulate confusing doctrines to reach just results in individual 
cases.242
 239. See generally Schwartz & Scott, supra note 134, at 545–46; Schwartz, supra 
note 232, at 419. 
 240. Schwartz, supra note 232, at 418–19. 
 241. Zamir, supra note 135, at 1713–14. 
 242. Skepticism about doctrines of interpretation is a major theme of MARVIN A. 
CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2001). 
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According to Zamir, in many legal systems contractual issues are 
supposedly resolved in an ordering that goes: express terms; parties’ 
intentions deducible from the contractual documents, and the circumstances 
surrounding its making; indications from the parties’ previous course of 
dealings; trade usages; statutory or judicial default rules; general 
principles of contract law such as good faith or the realization of 
reasonable expectations.243  The hierarchy can be seen as involving a 
move from individual will to social values and from factual inquiry 
(about intentions) to normative evaluation.244
Although American doctrine has not been rigid in denying access to 
an inferior source if a superior source seems to provide an answer, 
nonetheless, something like a similar hierarchy has been presumed.  That 
has been challenged by followers of Karl Llewellyn, who oppose any 
such hierarchy of sources; and the U.C.C. and Restatement (Second) 
emphasize the importance of implied terms, commercial context, trade 
usages, and ideas of fair dealing and reasonable expectations.245
Zamir argues that these are much more important than even the 
“Llewellyn position” acknowledges.  Trade usages and ideas of fairness 
deeply influence how express terms are interpreted,246 and their 
importance is greatly increased by obstacles to altering standard legal 
terms.  Judges create some of these obstacles to assure that stronger 
parties have not taken advantage of weaker ones.247  Expectations of the 
parties generate other obstacles; a party may hesitate to propose a term 
more favorable to her than the standard one, because she fears the other 
party may be put off, regarding her as someone who is sharply 
bargaining for unfair advantage.248  Further, the course of performance is 
often taken to waive terms in the written contract.249
Zamir contends that this actual emphasis on trade usage, fairness, and 
reasonable expectations not only can serve values of public welfare, fair 
dealing, reasonable (mild) paternalism, and efficiency (in countering the 
 243. Zamir, supra note 135, at 1712. 
 244. Id. at 1718–19. 
 245. Id. at 1713.  However, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §203 (b) (1981) 
orders in weight express terms, course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of 
trade. 
 246. Zamir, supra note 135, at 1721–27. 
 247. Id. at 1738–44. 
 248. Id. at 1756–57. 
 249. Id. at 1736. 




effect of imperfect markets and bounded rationality),250 but may also 
reflect the intentions of parties, who often are not aware of specific 
terms, and, in any event, expect relations not to be rigidly dictated by 
express terms.251  One way to conceptualize the reliance on some of 
these nontextual sources is that courts are interpreting practices of 
contracting parties more than the terms of their texts.  Nothing Zamir 
says suggests that bargaining equals cannot control their relations by 
express terms if together they try hard to do so, but other factors clearly 
play a greater role in the law of contracts than in the law of wills. 
The challenge from the other direction is that express terms continue 
to play a greater role than one would gather from the U.C.C. and the 
Restatement (Second), that this is normatively desirable, and that a move 
back toward a textual approach to contracts that assumes that they are 
written in “majority talk” would serve the interests of the law of 
contracts as it applies to sophisticated parties dealing with each other.252
Part of the “anti-antiformalist” challenge against the flexible approach 
that derives from Llewellyn is that despite local customary trade practice, 
more general trade practices are necessary to make his approach work 
for national markets, and these are often absent.253  Many scholars were 
surprised by Lisa Bernstein’s claim that within trade associations 
themselves, those resolving disputes tend to adopt textualist approaches, 
not to inquire about unwritten trade practices.254  Although it does not 
follow that generalist judges should necessarily take the same posture,255 
the Bernstein findings at least cast doubt on the desirability of judges 
relying heavily on trade practices that are reflected in a contract. 
Most of the discussions about desirable interpretive strategies have 
been directed at the practice of courts, but Avery Katz has pointed out 
that parties in various ways, including how they write their contracts and 
how they choose those who will interpret them, can affect whether 
interpretation will be textualist or more encompassing.256
 250. Id. at 1777–1802. 
 251. Zamir, supra note 135, at 1771–76. 
 252. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 134, at 549–50.  One suggestion about the 
flexible standards of the Restatement and the U.C.C. is that the members of the bodies 
enacting them may have had self-interested reasons to prefer such flexibility.  Alan 
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. 
L. REV. 595, 597 (1995). 
 253. David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842, 845 (1999). 
 254. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: 
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 
1735–37 (2001). 
 255. Avery Katz points out that industry tribunals may be formalist partly because 
the judges are already expert and do not need external information that might help a 
generalist judge.  Katz, supra note 139, at 526. 
 256. Id. at 508–12. 
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The particular questions about textualist emphasis that arise in contracts 
law do not replicate themselves exactly with statutes and constitutions; 
but one avenue for exploration of textualism in those domains is inquiry 
whether the disputes over contractual interpretation have relevance. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
We have seen in respect to contracts and wills that deciding just how 
courts should treat documents that are framed by private individuals and 
carry legal authority is fairly complex.  Here we need not worry about 
the complications of having hundreds of authors or the survival of a 
text’s mandatory force over centuries, yet courts and scholars struggle 
with the right balance of subjective and objective elements, and what 
looks right for wills does not look exactly right for contracts.  This 
investigation of wills and contracts can provide a helpful comparative 
perspective when one turns to statutory and constitutional interpretation. 
We can understand the awkwardness of trying to apply the single 
inquiry approach to the job of courts.  With wills, if a legal rule gives a 
definite meaning to a term, judges will assume that the term carries that 
meaning (at least barring overwhelming evidence that the testator meant 
something different).  Suppose the will says “heirs,” and a disappointed 
relative claims that the testator meant the term in a way that does not 
correspond with strict legal usage.  The court finds only modest evidence 
to support the position.  It decides to give the term its standard legal 
significance without trying to resolve what the testator actually meant.  
The author’s intent theorist might respond, “Perhaps the real meaning 
here was the loose colloquial sense of ‘heirs’; but because there was not 
overwhelming evidence to this effect, the court used the standard sense, 
realizing that it was either carrying out the true meaning or displacing 
that meaning on evidentiary grounds.”  This is a possible conceptualization, 
but it is unwieldy.  Saying that “the meaning in this will is the standard 
sense in the absence of overwhelming evidence of a contrary intent” is 
much cleaner. 
The difficulties for the author’s intent approach become even greater 
for contracts. Shall we suppose that whenever the parties have different 
understandings, there is no single meaning in the contract but two 
meanings at odds with each other? 257  On that view, what courts are 
 257. On the author’s intent approach, it will not do to say that the real meaning is 
the one that is the more reasonable. 
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doing is deciding which meaning will count legally, rather than 
determining what the meaning of the contract is.  Yet those in the law 
typically suppose that courts are determining the meaning of contractual 
terms.  And if judges are confident that at least one party adopted the 
more reasonable understanding, they need not resolve whether the parties 
shared that meaning or did not.  The single-inquiry theorist may have to 
say that according to the rules of contract law, courts often do not even 
take the initial step of deciding if there was one meaning or two; rather, 
they decide that a meaning will prevail whether shared or not. 
Thus, in both wills and contracts, judges often do not even resolve 
step one of the single-inquiry approach: what is the real meaning or 
meanings?  If they do not resolve step one, judges also will not focus on 
whether to displace meaning, because they will not know if, by adopting 
a meaning, they will be adhering to a real meaning they have not taken 
the effort to discern or will be displacing the real meaning.  Nothing 
prevents a theorist from working out all these circumlocutions, but they 
begin to seem like the epicycles needed to explain how the sun circles 
the earth.  For law, the pluralist account, which acknowledges that courts 
consider many factors to resolve the meaning of authoritative legal texts, 
is vastly more straightforward. 
 
